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ABSTRACT 
 
Toward a Regulative Virtue Epistemology for the Theory and Practice of Education. 
(August 2011) 
Mark Jason Ortwein, B.A., Oklahoma State University; M.S., Pittsburg State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. G. Patrick Slattery 
 
This dissertation develops and explores how a particular variety of virtue 
epistemology (VE) applies to the theory and practice of education. To this end, several 
key issues are addressed: knowledge and epistemology, knowledge in education, virtue 
and culture, and the application of a particular variety of VE to education. 
Furthermore, this dissertation employs a philosophical methodology based in 
theoretical work from two disciplines—philosophy and education.  
In Chapter I, I explicate the purpose of this dissertation and provide a rationale 
for pursuing this project. I also clarify some key terminology, discuss some delimiting 
factors, and offer chapter previews. In Chapter II, I discuss how Edmond Gettier 
challenged the standard definition of knowledge as justified true belief. This resulted 
in the development of virtue-based epistemologies. Having distinguished between 
several forms of VE, I conclude this chapter by advancing regulative virtue 
epistemology (RVE). In Chapter III, I provide a conceptual and historical overview of 
the concept of knowledge in the specific context of educational theory. This discussion 
provides important context for the application of RVE to educational matters. In 
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Chapter IV, I consider how the concept of virtue is understood in several diverse 
cultural contexts. Here I ameliorate a potential worry—that virtue is a distinctly 
Western concept. Finally, in Chapter V, I apply RVE to the theory and practice of 
education. It is shown that RVE has important implications for the epistemic aims of 
education—that is, the ultimate knowledge-related purposes of education. Specifically, 
I find that understanding offers a more holistic account of educational theorizing, and 
places greater responsibility on teachers and students in their educational activities. I 
also conclude that RVE widens the aims of education to include other epistemic goods. 
I then demonstrate that communication—an important feature of education—is also 
regulated by intellectual virtue. Finally, I present two proposals for teaching from an 
RVE perspective, and find that each has particular strengths and weaknesses.  I 
conclude with some areas for future research.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
BACKGROUND 
When I began my doctoral program at Texas A&M University, I only had a 
very vague idea about what I wanted to study. Initially, I thought I would conduct 
research in the intellectual history of education. This seemed a good way to combine 
my interest in history with my penchant for theorizing. I still have ambitions to do 
work in this area and a few solid research ideas too. However, my interests took a 
decidedly philosophical turn during the fall of 2008.  
I began to reflect on the concept of knowledge. I do not recall what prompted 
this shift, likely some conversation with my future advisor. Nevertheless, these 
musings led me to the (somewhat obvious) conclusion that teachers and academics 
alike are tied to knowledge in very particular and interesting ways. Teachers, naturally, 
are clearly interested in knowledge—teaching or facilitating the acquisition of it, 
arranging it, highlighting or avoiding it, and so forth. Academics are also deeply 
involved with knowledge. They teach it too, but they also consume and produce a 
particular kind of knowledge—a variety that functions in a particular way. In short, 
knowledge is an important feature of education. However, I also noticed that there 
seemed to be two (broadly conceived) ways of talking about knowledge in education. 
According to one account, knowledge is the indubitable result of rigorous quantitative 
 _______________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Educational Theory.  
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research. According to the other, it is highly fluid, contextual, socially constructed, 
relative, or some mixture of all these. Thus, given my lack of clarity and the 
overwhelming number of frameworks to choose from, it seemed worthwhile to pursue 
a deeper understanding of the concept of knowledge. With my advisor’s support and 
encouragement, I ventured into the philosophy department and took my first course in 
epistemology.  
Initially, I had difficulty relating these concepts to the field of education. 
Although immensely interesting, epistemology is generally a very abstract and 
narrowly focused discipline. This makes its direct application very difficult, even 
indirect application involves a stretch. Perhaps halfway through the course, however, 
we began to reflect upon the notion of virtue epistemology (VE). I was immediately 
struck by its relevance for education and made a mental note of it. As I progressed 
through my program, and took more courses in the philosophy and education 
departments, VE’s significance for education became clearer. Once more I began to 
reflect upon VE but this time as a potential dissertation topic. In the following section, 
I suggest several reasons why VE is a worthy topic of study for education. I then 
clarify the purpose of this dissertation.  
RATIONALE AND PURPOSE 
There are several reasons for introducing VE into the theoretical discourse in 
education. In the first place, VE has attracted considerable attention in the discipline of 
philosophy, some going as far as to suggest that it can overcome certain intractable 
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debates in epistemology.1 It appears that little has been written on VE in education, 
however. This is somewhat surprising given our (educational theorists’) tendency to 
draw from sources outside education. Perhaps education’s inclination to favor 
“continental” philosophical sources explains this oversight, or perhaps epistemology is 
simply too abstracted from educational concerns. Regardless, VE—especially the 
variety discussed herein—is directly applicable to education in a way that traditional 
epistemological approaches are not.2  
A second reason for introducing VE concerns the nature of education. I will 
argue in this dissertation that education (broadly understood) is a deeply “epistemic” 
concept.  Harvey Siegel offers a similar assessment. 
Education is not only rich in epistemological content and relevance; 
specific epistemological issues— for example, those concerning ultimate 
epistemic aims and values, and the evidential status of testimony—are 
helpfully viewed in the context of education, such that thinking about 
education promises substantial benefit for the pursuit of standard 
epistemological questions. This is especially true in the current 
epistemological climate, in which both virtue epistemology and social 
epistemology are high on the epistemological agenda.3 
Given education’s implicit connection to epistemological concepts, it seems 
appropriate to consider what contemporary epistemologists are working on. This is 
                                                
1. For examples, see Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996); Ernest Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of 
Knowledge,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5, no. 1 (1980). 
 
2. I would qualify that statement by noting that I am making a broad generalization about “traditional 
epistemology”—one that should be taken as such. 
 
3. Harvey Siegel, “Is ‘Education’ a Thick Epistemic Concept?” Philosophical Papers 37, no. 3 (2008): 
456. 
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especially true because it appears that epistemologists have received relatively little 
attention from educational theorists in recent years.4 Thus, a secondary aim of this 
dissertation is to introduce the discipline of epistemology to curriculum and 
educational theorists whose knowledge may be lacking in this area. 
 A third reason to pursue a project in VE involves its recognition that belief 
formation is an important human endeavor. This is discussed at length in Chapters II 
and V. Very succinctly, VE is aptly referred to as “person-based” epistemology.5 This 
is because it centers its philosophical analysis on the character traits and qualities of 
human beings—those traits that dispose persons to successfully acquire knowledge and 
other epistemic goods. This is very different from traditional epistemology, where 
analysis is directed outwardly toward various features of “true belief.” Persons are 
generally neglected in this form of epistemology.6 For simplicity sake, however, VE 
recognizes that knowing and other forms of epistemic activity are richly human 
activities. Thus, VE speaks directly to education as a field ripe with epistemologically 
significant intellectual activity. 
 A fourth and final reason to undertake such a project concerns the epistemic 
aims of education. By epistemic aims, I mean the knowledge and belief related goals 
that education presumably ought to strive for. In this dissertation, I contend that 
                                                
4. I found no “source” for this claim—so it is largely based on informed speculation. In truth, this might 
make an interesting topic for a future project.  
 
5. For further discussion of “person-based” and “belief-based” epistemology, see Linda Zagzebski, Virtues 
of the Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
 
6. A much fuller treatment of this issue is offered in Chapter II.  
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education presently focuses overmuch on knowledge and skill. These are also epistemic 
aims and important ones, but I claim that understanding should be the chief epistemic 
goal of education.7 Here I draw mainly from Jonathan Kvanvig’s work on epistemic 
value.8 Understanding, I maintain, encapsulates these other aims and is regulated and 
motivated by the intellectual virtues. This observation is important because it offers 
(yet more) reasons to question current educational policies—and solid philosophical 
motives for doing so.  
The reasons for conducting this study (listed above) are directly tied to its 
primary purpose. In curriculum theory—and education generally—it appears that little 
has been written on the topic of intellectual virtue and its relation to the epistemic aims 
of education. This dissertation attempts to remedy this by focusing on the relationship 
intellectual virtue shares with education—education as a concept deeply tied to matters 
of epistemic importance. Presently, there is a growing body of literature on the topic of 
intellectual virtue in epistemology—what has come to be known as virtue 
epistemology. In fact, since its emergence in the early 1980s, it has come to occupy a 
central place in epistemological studies.9 My main ambition, then, is to bring VE into 
educational discourse—to see what it might offer theorists in education. This project, 
however, is based on a presupposition—that epistemology (in general) is important 
                                                
7. The concept of understanding is not new to educational discourse. For an excellent example, see 
William Pinar and others, Understanding Curriculum: An Introduction to the Study of Historical and 
Contemporary Curriculum Discourses (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2002). 
 
8. For further discussion of this issue, see Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit 
of Understanding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 
9. Harvey Siegel, “Is Education a ‘Thick’ Epistemic Concept?” 456. 
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and worthy of study, especially in the context of education. I consider this assumption 
in the following section. 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EPISTEMOLOGY 
Contemporary educational theory is extremely theoretically diverse. This is 
manifest in the sheer number of research methodologies available to scholars. In his 
important new volume, Encyclopedia of Curriculum Studies, Craig Kridel lists 49 
distinct theoretical perspectives.10 It is unsurprising that some of these theoretical 
standpoints conflict, often quite fundamentally, with one another. One way to explain 
this diversity would be to evaluate the epistemological assumptions these theories rest 
upon. If one holds that the external world can be empirically and objectively known (as 
positivistic researchers believe) this entails a commitment to a particular account of 
knowledge—a particular epistemology. Likewise, if one is dubious of such claims (as 
a constructivist might be) and favors the social construction of knowledge—again, a 
set of epistemological assumptions is operative. However one comes down on these 
matters, it is undeniable that epistemological assumptions play a significant role in 
what counts as knowledge in education. Thus, a guiding assumption in this work is that 
epistemology (theory of knowledge) is fundamental to the scholarly activity and 
development of the field. In what follows, I offer a specific example that illustrates the 
significance of having a robust conceptual understanding of knowledge. Following this 
discussion, I address some further assumptions that undergird this work, the scope and 
                                                
10. Craig Kridel, “Reader’s Guide,” in Encyclopedia of Curriculum Studies, Vol. 2, ed. Craig Kridel 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications), xvi. 
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limitations of this study, define some key concepts, and describe the methodology 
employed. I conclude with a summary of subsequent chapters.  
 Aaron Pallas has suggested that education programs have failed to prepare 
future scholars for the "epistemological diversity" that characterizes contemporary 
theory. He notes, "experienced researchers and novices alike find it hard to keep up 
with the cacophony of diverse epistemologies."11 The problem is that range of 
theoretical positions available to budding and seasoned scholars alike is often 
overwhelming, and universities often give too little attention to adequately training 
future professors in basic epistemology. As a result, researchers are sometimes 
initiated into particular theoretical camps and have little knowledge of the 
philosophical underpinnings of other perspectives. In other cases, they are given a 
cursory scan of the major frameworks and accrue only a skin-deep command of any 
given epistemology. This is problematic, he argues, because an adequate understanding 
of epistemology is "central to the production and consumption of educational 
research.”12 In other words, one's understanding of, and capacity to produce, creative 
research hinges on an ability to identify and understand epistemological commitments. 
Moreover, the ability to meaningfully communicate with those outside one's tradition 
entails an understanding of other epistemological frameworks. 
 Pallas's article illustrates a more general problem in educational research: 
Within educational theory, there are latent tensions grounded in epistemological 
                                                
11. Aaron M. Pallas, “Preparing Education Doctoral Students for Epistemological Diversity,” Educational 
Researcher 30, no. 1 (2001): 6. 
 
12. Ibid., 6. 
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diversity, and too often insufficient understanding of the various paradigms 
exacerbates these tensions. An implicit goal of this dissertation is to present an 
epistemological framework that operates comfortably within these contested 
theoretical spaces—one that can bridge (some) of these theoretical gaps. This is, of 
course, a lofty goal and one that exceeds the stated objectives of this dissertation. 
Nevertheless, I believe that VE’s future is bright in education and that others will 
begin to explore its potential.  
DEFINITIONS 
This dissertation spans two academic disciplines and employs a fair amount of 
potentially unfamiliar terminology. Here I provide fairly robust list of definitions that 
should aid the reader in navigating some of the concepts under consideration. I also 
clarify some phrases that might be confusing. 
Epistemology: Nicholas Rescher provides the following succinct definition of 
epistemology, “The mission of epistemology, the theory of knowledge, is to clarify 
what the conception of knowledge involves, how it is applied, and to explain why it 
has the features it does.”13 However, the span of subjects covered under the umbrella 
of epistemology is quite broad. Issues related to probability, epistemic luck, warrant 
and justification, the status of testimony, and a host of other related issues are captured 
by the term—epistemology. In this dissertation, I limit my discussion of epistemology 
to a set of concerns that arose in the wake of Edmond Gettier’s famous three-page 
bombshell—“Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” These debates concern the nature 
                                                
13. Nicholas Rescher, Epistemology: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2003), xiii. 
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of justification (externalism vs. internalism) and the structure of justification 
(foundationalism vs. coherentism). Herein, I refer to this kind of epistemology as 
traditional epistemology.  
Educational Epistemology: Educational scholars often use the word 
epistemology in a much broader sense than philosophers. Usually it refers to a 
particular theoretical framework(s) or concept of knowledge. In this dissertation I use 
the plural—epistemologies—in this sense. The reader should bear this in mind when 
reading Chapter III. 
Moral Virtue: In this dissertation, moral virtues are defined as “an acquired 
base of excellent functioning in some generically human sphere of activity that is 
challenging and important.”14 Examples of virtue include: honesty, courage, and 
charity. Moral virtues, as deeply engrained character traits, are manifested in our 
conduct and behavior—how we comport ourselves in the world, our ethical conduct.   
Intellectual Virtue: Like their moral counterparts, intellectual virtues are deep 
character traits that dispose and motivate us toward excellent thinking. What makes 
them distinctly intellectual is that they describe the character of our cognitive 
engagement with the world. 
Virtue Epistemology: Virtue epistemology is an approach to the theory of 
knowledge that emphasizes the character traits and/or the qualities of persons; it is 
person-based epistemology. There is substantial diversity of thought among virtue 
                                                
14. Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 59.  
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epistemologists, but most theorists adopt either virtue reliabilism and/or virtue 
responsibilism.  
Regulative Epistemology: A regulative epistemology is one that provides 
guidance for cognizing. It “clarifies the character of the intellectual life in a way that 
can actually help people live that life.”15 
Virtue Reliabilism: John Greco and John Turri offer the following definition of 
a reliable virtue. “A virtue is a stable and successful disposition: an innate ability or an 
acquired habit, that allows one to reliably achieve some good. An intellectual virtue 
will then be a cognitive excellence: an innate ability or acquired habit that allows one 
to reliably achieve some intellectual good, such as truth in a relevant matter.”16 These 
include cognitive features like memory, reasoning ability, and the perceptual faculties. 
Virtue Responsibilism: Other virtue epistemologists conceive of intellectual 
virtues in the traditional sense—as character traits and dispositions like intellectual 
honesty, conscientiousness, and open-mindedness. These virtues are characteristics of 
the excellent knower. 
Coherentism: Coherentism is the theory that our all our beliefs are justified by 
other beliefs, but that no belief in this system is privileged or foundationally secure. A 
person’s belief is justified when it coheres with the larger structure of beliefs.  
                                                
15. Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, 28. 
 
16. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. “Virtue Epistemology,” (by John Greco and John Turri), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/epistemology-virtue, section 5.1 (accessed April 10, 
2011). 
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Foundationalism: Foundationalists hold that justified belief entails a set of 
bedrock foundational beliefs that require no further justification. This is (in part) a 
response to the problem of infinite regress. Briefly, the problem infinite regress states 
that since all our beliefs are justified by other beliefs—ad infinitum—we have no 
reason to believe any of our beliefs are justified. These foundational beliefs are 
supposed to block the regress problem. 
Externalism: Externalists hold, contrary to Internalists, that justification for 
belief requires additional components that are external to the mind. 
Internalism: Internalists deny that the external world plays any part in 
justification; it is purely an internal (mental) phenomenon. 
DELIMITATIONS 
First, this is an interdisciplinary project, drawing from the discipline of 
philosophy and theoretical work in education. My target audience—educational 
theorists and epistemologists—will have varying degrees of expertise in epistemology 
and educational theorizing, respectively. As such, I try to walk a fine line between 
over-sophistication and over-simplification. Of course, at various points each group 
will encounter issues or topics that they are already familiar with. This is unavoidable. 
Nevertheless, I believe that “bridge-making” is important, and my hope for this 
dissertation is that it provides a line of communication between education and 
epistemology.  
Second, this inquiry into the educational merits of VE is constrained by the 
scope of the topic itself. Over the course of its short history, several perspectives have 
 12 
surfaced that occupy a central place in the literature. Some writers, most prominently 
Ernest Sosa, favor virtue responsibilism,17 others advocate a form of responsibilism,18 
and still others draw mainly from Aristotle.19 From these, and the innumerable 
variations they have spawned, a broad body of literature has emerged. I provide a 
general account of each, but only give sustained attention to a particular form of VE—
a regulative form as found in Roberts and Wood.20 Thus, I do not discuss the 
educational benefits of virtue reliabilism, for example. It should be noted, however, 
that work could be done in this area. It would be especially interesting to investigate 
how both varieties of VE might be brought together in education. 
Virtue has a long history in education. From what I have observed thus far, 
however, this discussion appears to be almost entirely restricted to the moral virtues. 
Advocates of character and moral education, for example, have long advocated the 
cultivation of moral virtue. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the distinction 
between moral and intellectual virtues is not always clear. Linda Zagzebski, for 
example, has attempted to create a unified account of ethics (moral virtue) and 
epistemology (intellectual virtue).21 While this is certainly interesting and plausible, it 
                                                
17. See Ernest Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of 
Knowledge,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5, no. 1 (1980): 3-26;  
 
18. For an exemplary work in this tradition, see James Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic 
Responsibility, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993). 
 
19. Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
 
20. Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtue. 
 
21. Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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extends beyond the scope of this dissertation. As noted above, the purpose of this 
dissertation is primarily to consider the intellectual virtues and their relation to the 
epistemic goals of education.22 As such, I have chosen limit my analysis to intellectual 
virtues and the literature that best explicates them—in short, the literature in VE. I 
fully intend to explore how VE fits within the moral and character education literature 
in future work. 
Finally, I want to address an important issue that arises in Chapters II and V. 
Virtue epistemology stems from a distinctly Western intellectual tradition, and the 
sources and philosophers discussed these chapters are also Western. I have not 
intentionally omitted the voices of other cultures; I have simply been constrained by 
what resources are available. To ameliorate this imbalance, I have tried to include as 
many points-of-view as possible in other chapters. This is not a delimiting factor, 
precisely, but I do think it is worth noting. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 Here I wish to acknowledge the presuppositions that govern my philosophical 
orientation. First, I assume that there is a mind-independent world that is accessible, 
and from which knowledge can be gained. Put simply, when I speak of seeing a tree 
branch outside my window, I can reasonably claim that there are such things as tree 
branches; they exist and I can know things about them. This does not preclude the 
possibility of error. David Lewis describes a number of skeptical arguments against the 
possibility of knowledge: “Let your paranoid fantasies rip—CIA plots, hallucinogens 
                                                
22. An exception occurs in Chapter IV, where I consider the concept of virtue in other cultural contexts. 
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in the tap water, conspiracies to deceive, Old Nick himself—soon you find that 
uneliminated possibilities of error are everywhere. Those possibilities of error are far-
fetched, of course, but possibilities all the same.”23 In sum, it is always possible to 
undermine ordinary knowledge with a little inventiveness, but solving these 
longstanding skeptical problems is not the aim of this dissertation. Instead, I start with 
the intuition that what we see, hear, taste, touch, and smell is actually there—is 
knowable. Given the prevalence of anti-realist epistemologies in education, this fact 
marks a distinguishing characteristic of this dissertation.  
A second assumption is that virtue—be it intellectual or otherwise—is relevant 
and salutary to the education of children, and should be seriously considered in the 
context of education. Moreover, I also assume that the intellectual lives of persons can 
be conducted well or poorly depending upon the intellectual virtues or vices that 
govern their intellectual conduct. Thus, I assume that intellectual character is 
evaluable. 
METHODOLOGY 
It is standard practice in education to articulate the research methodology used 
in a dissertation. Thus, this dissertation employs a theoretical or philosophical 
methodology. Specifically, I follow the American Philosophical Association’s 
description of research in philosophy. “Research in philosophy also often takes the 
form of efforts to refine analyses, develop and advance or criticize interpretations, 
explore alternative perspectives and new ways of thinking, suggest and apply modified 
                                                
23. David Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, no. 4 (1996): 549.  
 
 15 
or novel modes of assessment, and, in general to promote new understanding.”24 The 
operative words in this passage are “explore” and “promote new understanding.” The 
RVE advanced in Chapter V is the product of rigorous and extended exploration in the 
form of reading, contemplation, discourse with friends and mentors, and writing. It 
generates new understanding insofar as it represents the first large-scale attempt to 
position VE within the context of education. 
CHAPTER PREVIEWS 
In this introductory chapter, I presented an account of how I came to be 
interested in the topic of VE. I offered several reasons for its importance, an account of 
the purpose of this dissertation, and a rationale for considering epistemology generally. 
I then offered a robust list of definitions and acknowledged some delimitations and 
assumptions that shape this dissertation. Here I want to provide a general overview of 
what I plan to do in this dissertation.  
In Chapter II, I introduce the discipline of epistemology from roughly 1960 to 
the present day. First, I discuss the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true 
belief. I explain how Edmond Gettier deeply problematized this definition, and offer a 
summary account of how epistemologists have dealt with the problems that he 
engendered. In particular, I focus on the problem of “credit”—the view that knowledge 
has to be somehow creditable to persons rather than the product of mere luck. This 
problem—among others—represents a key motivator for VE. Thus I begin my 
discussion of VE with a historical and conceptual overview. I show that there are two 
                                                
24. American Philosophical Association, “APA Statement on the Profession: Research in Philosophy,” 
http://www.apaonline.org/governance/statements/research.aspx (accessed December 15, 2010). 
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broad virtue-based approaches: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. I discuss 
each and position myself within the latter category. I then make another distinction 
between “narrow” and “wide” epistemology—where narrow indicates epistemology 
that focuses almost exclusively on knowledge, and wide indicates epistemology that 
concerns itself with additional epistemic goods. Thus, the VE I endorse is both wide 
and part of the virtue responsibilism tradition. I conclude with a discussion of 
“regulative” epistemology—another important feature of the theory I advocate. 
In Chapter III, I consider how knowledge functions in the context of 
educational theory. The main purpose of this chapter is to present an epistemological 
map of theorizing in education—to get the lay of the land, so to speak. I begin with a 
historical analysis of the reconceptualization of curriculum studies—a movement that 
radically altered the academic study of curriculum. I claim that this signaled an 
epistemic shift away from simplistic accounts of knowledge. Following this discussion, 
I consider three broad epistemological orientations in education. These include anti-
realist epistemologies, critical epistemologies, and realist epistemologies. Within each 
of these categories, I identify representative theories and explicate their 
epistemological assumptions. As I progress, I also draw connections between these 
theoretical orientations and VE. I conclude by drawing attention to an interesting 
analogy between epistemology and education. 
In Chapter IV, I consider the possibility that virtue is a distinctly Western 
concept. In question form, are character traits like honesty, courage, and compassion 
valued and encouraged in other cultural contexts? This is an important issue, given the 
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cultural diversity found in many classrooms across the United States. Thus, I offer 
analyses of five distinct intellectual and cultural traditions—Confucianism, Buddhism, 
ancient Greek philosophy, and the Yoruba and Akan peoples of Western Africa. I draw 
extensively from works of philosophy, traditional proverbs, customary practices, and 
the like. I show that each group has rich accounts of virtue, but that these accounts are 
not identical. I consider this asymmetry and suggest that further research should be 
done to evaluate its bearing on VE. 
Finally, in Chapter V, I introduce a regulative virtue theory and consider its 
implications for education. I begin by suggesting that contemporary education is 
overly focused on two epistemic goods—knowledge and skill. I reiterate the concept of 
“wide” virtue epistemology with its emphasis on other epistemic goods. I then discuss 
three of these epistemic goods—knowledge, acquaintance, and understanding. I argue 
that understanding is chief among these because it captures or entails these other 
epistemic goods. Having developed a concept of understanding, I then articulate how 
the intellectual virtues shape and motivate its acquisition by highlighting three 
particular intellectual virtues, intellectual honesty, courage and caution, and 
conscientiousness. This discussion provides conceptual context for applying RVE to 
the social domain of education, especially via communication. Here I consider how 
understanding functions as a social epistemic goal, and how the intellectual virtues 
shape communicative practices. I then consider how RVE shapes practice through two 
proposals for teaching intellectual virtue. While these respective strategies have their 
merits, they are also ill suited for contemporary education with its emphasis on high-
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stakes testing. I conclude this dissertation with some areas for potential research, and a 
few summative remarks. 
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CHAPTER II 
EPISTEMOLOGY: 
TWENTIETH CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS 
 
 Epistemology, although referenced often in education, is seldom discussed in 
its native context—that is, within the context of Western philosophical literature. 
Rather, it is generally understood in the context of learning theories or research 
paradigms. Thus, this chapter provides a concise overview of epistemology from the 
mid-twentieth century to the present day. Most readers, I believe, will be unfamiliar 
with this material. I begin with an explication of the concept of knowledge itself: What 
sort of thing is it? This is followed by a discussion of Edmond Gettier’s important and 
provocative observations about the “standard” definition of knowledge, and the 
debates about justification that arose in its wake. Such debates, in fact, provided 
impetus for the development of virtue-based epistemology—the final section of this 
chapter. Here I outline two strains of VE that have emerged in the past thirty years. I 
then make a further distinction between narrow and wide epistemology, followed by a 
discussion of several commonly cited intellectual virtues. I conclude by positioning 
myself within this theoretical framework.  
WHAT IS EPISTEMOLOGY? 
 Epistemology derives from the Greek word, episteme, which translates as 
knowledge. Thus epistemology is the systematic study of knowledge. Among the 
central questions that concern epistemologists are: "What are the necessary and 
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sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and 
what are its limits" Concerning the issue of justified belief, it answers questions like: 
"How we are to understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs 
justified? Is justification internal or external to one's own mind?"25 Questions of this 
sort pick out an important feature of traditional epistemology; it is centrally concerned 
with analyzing various features of justified belief. It does not consider how the 
character and cognitive traits of persons might influence our understanding of 
knowledge and its function in our lives. Rather it restricts its analysis to beliefs; it is 
belief-based. (I will show a little later that some modern movements in epistemology 
have redirected this analysis away from beliefs, and instead focus on persons as 
reliable and/or responsible knowers.) In the remainder of this chapter, I will refer to 
this kind of epistemology—belief-based—as traditional epistemology. This term 
should not be construed as pejorative; it simply serves as a marker for epistemology 
that focuses primarily on belief. 
WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 
Late twentieth-century epistemology can also be understood as reckoning with 
a particular definition of knowledge—knowledge defined as justified true belief. The 
justified true belief definition takes the following form (where P is a proposition and S 
is a human subject): 
S knows that P if and only if:  
                                                
25. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. “Epistemology,” (by Matthias Steup), http://plato. 
stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/epistemology, section 1 (accessed June 1, 2011). 
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P is true 
S believes that P is true 
S is justified in believing that P is true 
Consider an example. Suppose Sarah sees a bird outside her window. She immediately 
forms the belief that there is a bird outside her window. Her belief is true because there 
really is a bird outside her widow. Thus Sarah holds a true belief, but she also must 
meet the justification condition. In other words, Sarah should have good reasons for 
believing she sees a bird outside her window. In this case, she does—she sees the bird. 
Because she meets all three conditions, Sarah can reasonably claim to know that there 
is a bird outside her window. But suppose she believes there is a bird outside her 
window, and there is a bird outside her window, but she cannot see the bird clearly or 
only caught a movement out of the corner of her eye. She holds a true belief, but we 
might worry that her reasons for believing are not strong enough. In this case, she fails 
to meet the justification condition and we might hesitate to count her true belief as a 
case of knowledge. Justified true belief is a useful definition that explains most 
ordinary cases of knowledge. As I will show a little later, however, justified true belief 
cannot fully explain knowledge. First, however, I sketch out a history of knowledge in 
the latter half of the twentieth century. 
FOUNDATIONS FOR VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
In 1963, Edmond Gettier, an American epistemologist, penned a landmark 
paper, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Here he demonstrated that the traditional 
definition of knowledge—justified true belief—could be problematized through a 
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series of cleverly constructed counter-examples.26 Gettier argued that a person could 
hold a true belief, and be justified in doing so, yet not be credited with knowledge. 
Consider the following examples:  
1. Fake Barn County 
Suppose Mark and Dashiell take a sightseeing trip through Kay County, 
Oklahoma. Unbeknownst to them, however, the denizens of Kay County have razed all 
but one barn in the county. They have erected barn facades in their place. From the 
road these fake barns are indistinguishable from real barns. As they are driving down a 
dusty county road, Dashiell points excitedly at a barn and exclaims, "That's a beautiful 
barn!" In fact, he is correct; he has unwittingly pointed to the only real barn in the 
entire county. He seems to meet all the requirements for justified true belief. It is true 
that he sees a real barn; he has good reason to believe that it is a barn; and he certainly 
believes he sees a barn.   
2. The Blue Suit 
Suppose Sarah has seen James wearing a blue suit on numerous occasions and 
heard him talk about how much he likes it. She comes to believe that he owns a blue 
suit. Suppose again that she says to herself, “James owns a blue suit, or Kimberly is in 
Rome.” She does not actually know where Kimberly is, but correctly reasons that the 
first half of the proposition entails the truth of the whole. James, however, does not 
own a blue suit (perhaps he just sold it) but Kimberly by chance actually is in Rome. 
Sarah holds a justified true belief. 
                                                
26. Edmond Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23 no. 6, (1963): 121-123. 
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In each example, these persons meet all the conditions for knowledge. First, their 
beliefs are justified: Dashiell clearly sees the barn, and Sarah exercises excellent 
reasoning. Second, their beliefs are actually true. And, third, they each hold these 
beliefs with little or no misgiving. We would hesitate, however, to call their beliefs 
knowledge because they seem to have been the recipients of a large measure of good 
luck.   
Unsurprisingly, Gettier’s paper prompted a flurry of responses. Solutions were 
offered and refuted; counter arguments were constructed and new examples composed. 
Despite this activity (and perhaps because of it) the problem only grew more in 
entrenched. Michael Huemer claims, “Gettier’s refutation started a cottage industry of 
knowledge-analyzers.”27 With time, however, it became increasingly clear that he had 
deeply altered the course of epistemology. According to Roberts and Wood: 
"Epistemologists appeared to think that salvation from Gettier lay in fastidiousness and 
technical finery, so that epistemology became increasingly ingrown, epicyclical, and 
irrelevant to broader philosophical and human concerns.”28 An alternative to 
traditional, belief-based, epistemology has been proposed—one that places persons at 
the center of philosophical analysis. In the following section, I explore a particular 
issue that emerges in the literature on Gettier—the issue of epistemic luck. I illustrate 
how VE is (in part) a response to this issue. 
                                                
27. Michael Huemer, ed., Epistemology: Contemporary Readings, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 436. 
  
28. Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtue, 5. 
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The preceding counter-examples demonstrate that the conditions of justified 
true belief can be met, but we might feel reluctant to attribute knowledge to either 
person.  It would seem more a matter of epistemic luck than true justification. Consider 
an analogy offered by Ernest Sosa. Suppose a highly skilled archer takes aim at a 
target and shoots. The arrow flies straight and true and is going to strike the bull’s-eye. 
Then, suddenly, a rogue gust of wind pulls the arrow from its course. It is no longer 
going to hit the bull’s-eye. Then, by chance, the same wind reverses its course and puts 
the arrow back in its original trajectory. Once more, it is going to hit the bull’s eye.29 
We may question whether the archer is reponsible for his accuracy of his shot; he 
seems to be merely the recipient of good fortune.  
Sosa’s example illustrates why some philosophers have defined knowledge as 
something like “non-accidentally” true belief.30 There are numerous ways of 
understanding such beliefs. John Greco, for example, holds non-accidental beliefs to 
be those for which a person can take credit.  He writes, “To say that someone knows is 
to say that his believing the truth can be credited to him. It is to say that the person got 
things right due to his own abilities, efforts and actions, rather than due to dumb luck, 
or blind chance, or something else.”31 This is so because having creditable reasons for 
a belief—justification—is thought to improve its worth or standing. If we reconsider 
the Gettier cases, it appears that Sarah and Dashiell do not deserve credit for the 
                                                
29. Ernest Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2007), 22. 
 
30. Duncan Pritchard, “Epistemic Luck,” Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (2004): 193. 
 
31. Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 111. 
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accuracy of their beliefs. They were merely lucky or, put differently, they did not 
obtain true beliefs by virtue of their own intellectual activity. Luck interposed. But 
suppose Dashiell and his father were driving through an ordinary country landscape—
one filled with real barns.  In this case, Dashiell’s declaration would seem a real case 
of knowledge—a case believing for which he can take credit. The notion of credit, 
however, moves us closer to the impulse behind VE. First, it illustrates why virtue 
epistemologists are centrally concerned with persons; to gain credit for a belief a 
person should form that belief in the right way, e.g., virtuously. And, second, it 
demonstrates why VE is sometimes called person-based epistemology. This is because 
it focuses its analysis on the traits of knowers themselves—on how they form their 
beliefs and how particular traits contribute to the warrant or justification of beliefs.  
SOME FORMS OF VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
We are now positioned to engage with VE directly. Here I provide a brief 
timeline of the conceptual development of VE. In particular, I analyze the work of key 
scholars in the field. In the process, I roughly divide VE into two major strains: virtue 
reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. This discussion provides a conceptual map of the 
VE terrain. Having explicated these positions, I then describe another distinction: 
narrow and wide forms of epistemology. Here I suggest that wide accounts have 
expanded the scope of epistemology, and that this opens the door for an applied VE. 
Building upon this latter point, I develop my account of VE—a regulative virtue 
epistemology. 
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Virtue epistemology is an emerging sub-discipline of epistemology that 
presents an alternative to traditional belief-based epistemology. Virtue epistemologists 
maintain that the acquisition of knowledge and other epistemic goods is tied to 
possession of intellectual virtue. On one account, these virtues include such qualities as 
intellectual courage, honesty, and inquisitiveness—to name three. Others classify the 
virtues as cognitive faculties like accurate memory and well-functioning perceptual 
faculties. Numerous philosophers have endorsed VE, and a vigorous body scholarship 
has sprung up around it.32 However, I am working under the assumption that few 
educational scholars are aware of the work being done in VE. Thus, I begin with by 
mapping out the conceptual terrain in VE.   
Virtue Reliabilism 
Ernest Sosa inaugurated virtue epistemology in 1981 with his article, "The Raft 
and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge." The 
aim of this paper was to present a theory of knowledge that could circumvent standard 
problems in contemporary epistemology. He uses the analogy of a "raft" to refer to 
coherence theory. Coherentists argue that a justified belief is one that coheres within a 
larger body of beliefs. Donald Davidson writes, “What distinguishes a coherence theory 
is simply the claim that nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another 
belief.”33 The "pyramid” refers to epistemic foundationalism. This is the view that 
                                                
32. For an comprehensive review of this scholarship, see Heather Battaly, “Introduction: Virtue and Vice. 
Metaphilosophy, 41 no. 1-2 (2010): 1-21. 
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 27 
some beliefs are foundational and require no further support or justification. Each 
system—coherentism and foundationalism—argues Sosa, is flawed.34  
Coherentism stresses the logical connections between our beliefs, but fails to 
account for beliefs at the periphery of our belief network. Foundationalism seems to 
present “a multitude of fundamental principles with no unifying ground.”35 Rather, 
Sosa urges epistemologists to shift their analysis to persons. In particular, he argues for 
the importance of the intellectual virtues. These virtues are reliable truth-conducive 
characteristics that enable a person to acquire true beliefs. Thus, Sosa’s view has been 
described as virtue-reliabilism. Among the virtues cited by Sosa are things like 
excellent memory and perceptual faculties, and a person possesses a virtue when it 
functions reliably in their cognitive lives. Furthermore, Sosa defines a justified belief 
as one that is grounded in the intellectual virtues. This provides a sort of foundation 
desired by the foundationalist—one rooted in the reliability of the intellectual virtues. 
It also leaves room for the Coherentist: “Coherence gives rise to justified belief and 
knowledge precisely because it is the manifestation of intellectual virtue…coherence 
increases reliability, and therefore constitutes a kind of intellectual virtue in its own 
right.”36 Thus, Sosa inaugurated a VE on the promise that it could succeed where other 
theories could not. 
                                                
34. “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge,” Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy 5, no. 1 (1980): 3-26. 
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Others have followed Sosa’s lead. John Greco, for example, defines the 
intellectual virtues in roughly the same way, as “innate faculties or acquired habits that 
enable a person to arrive at truth and void error in some relevant field.”37 Like Sosa he 
cites things like reliable memory, perception, and good reasoning ability. Greco also 
offers an interesting account of justification. He maintains that a person knows a given 
proposition when he or she believes it out of an intellectual virtue.  This involves three 
facets. First, a person must be motivated toward the truth and in possession of the right 
sort of disposition(s) to know. These dispositions are the products of intellectual 
virtue; they show up when one exercises an intellectual virtue. Second, a person’s 
belief must be the product of intellectual virtue(s)—that is, the epistemic good 
obtained is the result of exercising an intellectual virtue. And, third, a person’s true 
belief should be creditable to her.38 Both Greco and Sosa advance virtue-based 
epistemologies that hinge on the possession of reliable cognitive characteristics, and 
both hold that VE has much to offer in the way of addressing standard problems in 
epistemology. 
Virtue Responsibilism 
 Virtue-responsibilism also draws upon the intellectual virtues but defines them 
differently. Rather than describe them as characteristics of cognition (like reliabilists), 
they understand the virtues to be traits of character—things like open-mindedness, 
intellectual honesty, and conscientiousness. As such, they draw attention to the moral 
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nature of knowing and knowledge. In this section, I describe the work of two 
philosophers in this tradition—Lorraine Code and James Montmarquet. 
 In Epistemic Responsibility, Lorraine Code argues for an epistemology based in 
the recognition that knowledge is a social affair. She believes the chief epistemic virtue 
is responsibility—recognition that we are responsible for our beliefs and their function 
in wider society. She writes, “It is only those who, in their knowing, strive to do justice 
to the object—to the world they want to know as well as possible—who can aspire to 
intellectual virtue.” 39 Code’s account has a strong social justice thread running 
throughout. As such, her responsibilism begins with the assumption that we all inhabit 
a knowable world, one in which real problems exists. Knowledge that is gained 
through intellectual virtue more accurately reflects the true state of affairs in this 
world. This requires what she calls “normative realism.” Thus, “Intellectually virtuous 
persons value knowing and understanding how things really are.”40 And, finally, unlike 
Sosa and Greco, Code holds little hope for standard methodologies in epistemology. 
These, she thinks, are too narrow and have too little to do with the experience of being 
human.41 In other words, a central goal of her book is to provide an account of 
knowledge that accounts for human characteristics and qualities, and the social 
dimensions in which knowledge exists.  
                                                
39. Lorraine Code, Epistemic Responsibility, (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1987), 59. 
 
40. Ibid., 59. 
 
41. Ibid., 254. 
 
 30 
 Another important figure in virtue-responsibilism is James Montmarquet. He 
stresses the moral dimensions in knowledge, giving special attention to the 
significance of conscientiousness—the desire to gain truth and avoid error. His 
doctrine of conscientiousness is similar to Code’s concept of responsibility in that both 
emphasize the importance of striving for truth.42 However, Montmarquet points out 
that a love of truth is not sufficient; one could possess intellectual vices and still gain 
truth. Instead, he argues for three other safeguarding categories of virtue. Impartiality 
is “an openness to the ideas of others, the willingness to exchange ideas with and learn 
form them, the lack of jealousy and personal bias directed at their ideas, and the lively 
sense of one’s own infallibility.” Sobriety entails a set of related virtues that protect 
against hastiness in “the excitement of new and unfamiliar ideas, to embrace what is 
not really warranted, even relative to the limits of his own evidence.” And, finally, 
courage includes a “willingness to conceive and examine alternatives to popularly held 
beliefs, perseverance in the face of opposition from others (until one is convinced that 
one is mistaken), and the determination required to see such a project through to 
completion.”43 These three categories of virtue, and the chief virtue of 
conscientiousness, describe the personal characteristics of the responsible epistemic 
agent who desires truth belief. 
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Appropriating Aristotle—Linda Zagzebski 
Like Lorraine Code and James Montmarquet, Linda Zagzebski believes 
persons’ cognitive character is central to epistemology. Her approach, however, draws 
much more explicitly from Aristotle. Her most enduring work, Virtues of the Mind, is 
the most widely cited work of VE in the Aristotelian tradition.44 A central thesis of this 
book is that traditional epistemology has taken a wrong turn in its disputes over 
justification, and argues that epistemology can benefit from a virtue theory in the same 
way that ethics has. First, she claims that the structures of epistemology and ethics are 
strongly analogous. In ethics, the historically dominant views have been 
consequentialism and deontological ethics. She calls these "act-based" theories—a 
term that operates analogously to belief-based theory in epistemology.45 Of the former, 
consequentialism, her comments are particularly relevant. Consequentialists argue that 
what makes an action right can be evaluated by its consequences—whether more good 
or bad results. She links this theory to reliabilism, claiming that they are structurally 
identical. "In reliabilist theories the epistemic goal is to bring about true beliefs and to 
avoid bringing about false beliefs, just as on consequentialist theories the moral goal is 
to bring about good states of affairs and to avoid bringing about bad states of affairs.”46 
What is lost in both theories (consequentialism and reliabilism) is any consideration of 
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the motives or intentions of the agent. Reliabilism (like consequentialism) emphasizes 
maximizing an agent's true beliefs over her false beliefs. This clearly puts her at odds 
with the likes of Ernest Sosa, whose intellectual virtues she thinks are hardly virtues at 
all, or are virtues "only by courtesy.”47  
The scope of her project—to bring ethics and epistemology under the same 
banner of virtue theory—is grand indeed. In her Précis to Virtues of the Mind, she 
writes, "my purpose...was to outline a pure virtue theory that is rich enough to include 
an account of intellectual virtues within the same theory as moral virtues, and to show 
how such a theory can generate a way to handle both epistemic evaluation and moral 
evaluation."48 A central contention is that the boundaries erected between moral and 
intellectual virtue are a mistake, although each may have different ends in mind (e.g., 
moral virtues might strive for moral soundness whereas intellectual virtues promote 
excellent knowing). In particular, Zagzebski understands the intellectual virtues as 
possessing two main components—a motivation component that impels a person to 
acquire epistemic goods, and a success component wherein a person gets true belief 
from having believed virtuously. 
NARROW AND WIDE VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
Those in the VE tradition face a decision with regard to how they choose to 
relate to the standard problems of traditional epistemology. Some, Ernest Sosa, John 
Greco, and Linda Zagzebski, for example, have attempted to apply the concepts of VE 
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to these issues with debatable success. Such theorists aim to build systems that can 
deal with standard problems in epistemology—e.g., the aforementioned debates about 
justification. For example, both Sosa and Zagzebski have given a response to the 
Gettier problem, and both have offered analyses of knowledge that (although different 
in direction) attend to the historical dilemmas that have characterized post-Gettier 
epistemology. Furthermore, these theories can be viewed as viable (if contested) 
entries into the larger project of epistemology. In other words, they recognize and 
validate the traditional problems. I refer to these forms of VE as narrow accounts. 
 Others, however, have not been so sanguine about these attempts. Jonathan 
Kvanvig argues that VE's future look much brighter outside the domain of traditional 
epistemology and its controversies. He cites the work of Lorraine Code, James 
Montmarquet, and newer works by figures like Robert C. Roberts and Jay Wood as 
prime examples of philosophers who have extended the traditional margins of 
epistemology. This widening, of course, creates "an expansion of the issues and 
problems that become the targets of philosophical reflection of a particularly 
epistemological sort.”49 Those in this camp draw from a much wider array of sources, 
and believe that a wider range of epistemic goods is relevant to epistemology, e.g., 
understanding, wisdom, and acquaintance. They also refrain from creating narrowly 
focused epistemologies, and stress the importance of flexibility. The regulative virtue 
epistemology (RVE) advocated in this dissertation falls within this wide tradition.  
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A RATIONALE OF REGULATIVE VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
The rationale for introducing wide virtue epistemology to education is fourfold. 
First, education is already rife with fully developed learning and educational theories. 
While it is certainly possible to introduce another fully formed theory—a virtue-based 
theory—this project extends beyond my present interests. The goal herein is to 
introduce a form of RVE—one that provides guidance for epistemic practice, but one 
that is less theoretically polarizing and demanding of existing educational theories. 
Clearly there are points in this account of RVE that will diverge from existing theories, 
but this dissertation focuses primarily on the points of mutual points of agreement. It 
avoids theoretical head butting. It should also be noted that VE emerges out of a very 
distinct Western tradition and, to my knowledge, it has not been addressed in other 
cultural contexts. Thus, the lack of resources and theorists from other traditions reflects 
the relative infancy of VE as a discipline. 
Second, because this is the first large-scale attempt to introduce a VE and RVE 
to education, I believe it is helpful to limit analysis to a general account. The literature 
in wide VE is particularly rich in this respect, especially in its treatment of specific 
intellectual virtues.  
Third, an often-repeated theme in wide VE is the recognition that knowledge is 
a multifaceted and deeply human enterprise. So is education. The RVE advocated here 
recognizes and celebrates the richness of human epistemic activity in a manner that is 
highly commensurate with contemporary understandings of education.  
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And, fourth, wide VE has tended to extend the range of epistemic goods under 
consideration. In the age of No Child Left Behind, where the acquisition of 
propositional knowledge and skill predominate the curricula, it seems right to return to 
a more holistic account of the purpose of education.50 In summary, the choice to 
advance a wide regulative virtue epistemology does not preclude narrow approaches. 
Rather, it aims at maximizing analytic flexibility, accords well with education as a 
highly complex social endeavor, and broadens epistemology to include other epistemic 
goods.  
A REGULATIVE VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
One of the most important works of wide virtue epistemology in recent years is 
Intellectual Virtue: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology by Robert C. Roberts and W. 
Jay Wood. These authors aim to develop a “regulative” virtue epistemology and 
describe their work in the following way:  
Given the central place of knowledge and understanding in human life, 
one would expect epistemology to be one of the most fascinating and 
enriching fields of philosophy and itself an important part of an education 
for life. We might expect that any bright university student who got all 
the way to her junior year without dipping her mind in an epistemology 
course would have to hang her head in shame of her cultural poverty. But 
the character and preoccupations of much of the epistemology of the 
twentieth century disappoint this expectation. We think that the new 
emphasis on the virtues and their relation to epistemic goods has the 
potential to put epistemology in its rightful place. And we hope that the 
present book, whatever its many shortcomings in detail, will suggest the 
rich ways in which epistemology—the study of knowledge and related 
human goods—connects with ethical and political issues, with the 
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practice of science and other forms of inquiry, with religion and 
spirituality, with appreciation of the arts, and with the enterprise of 
education.51 
Roberts and Wood aim to widen the boundaries of epistemology, to put it in its right 
place. But exactly is its right place? In the first place, they note that life itself is rich 
with epistemic activity. “The intellectual life is characterized through and through by 
practices, and that the intellectual virtues fit us well to pursue these”52 Based on our 
knowledge we drive cars, make hamburgers, play the piano, and reformat hard drives. 
We think, discuss, interpret, reminisce, ponder, judge, and so forth. In short, our minds 
are highly active. Despite the constancy of our cognitive activity, the discipline of 
epistemology has had relatively little to say about these routine cases of thinking.  
A regulative epistemology is one that provides insight and guidance into the 
practice of the intellectual life. Nicolas Wolterstorff distinguishes this kind of 
epistemology from what he calls, “analytic epistemology,” epistemology that deals in 
theories of knowledge, true-belief, and justification in a systematic fashion.53 This term 
is synonymous with “traditional epistemology”—the term I use in this dissertation. 
Regulative epistemology, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with ethical nature 
of belief formation (and other epistemic states)—the view that cognizing is subject to 
ethical/moral evaluation. As such, the actual practices of thinking are subject to 
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normative critique. Regulative epistemology also holds that epistemic practices are 
important for the health and wellbeing of societies. According to Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
John Locke’s epistemology was regulative in this sense. He writes: 
I think we can best understand what Locke was doing by employing the 
concept of a doxastic practice (Greek doxa = belief). Locke was 
proposing a reform in the doxastic practices of his day. Those practices, 
he thought, were incapable of coping with the cultural crisis engulfing 
Europe in general and England in particular; they had, in fact, contributed 
to that crisis…Locke regarded his fellow citizens as not doing their best, 
when they should be, and not believing with a firmness appropriate to the 
results of that endeavor, his proposals had the status of proposals for 
reform. Locke was urging on his fellows that they reform their doxastic 
practice.54 
Locke linked flawed doxastic practices to the social tumult of his day. Only by 
reforming these practices would society find a way out of its difficulties. Thus 
regulative epistemology concerns both individuals and societies, and thus—education. 
What then is a regulative virtue epistemology? It is simply the position that our 
intellectual practices are evaluable based on the possession of intellectual virtues and 
vices. It explores how these intellectual virtues work in isolation and collectively to 
promote excellent thinking. Composing a final “authoritative” list of intellectual 
virtues, however, is not the aim of the dissertation. If such a list were possible—and I 
highly doubt that it is—it does not reflect a basic intention of this work. Likewise, the 
state of affairs in schools across the United States and in many other countries is one of 
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extreme ethnic and cultural diversity.55 Thus, this RVE represents an attempt to respect 
diversity while recognizing that certain epistemic virtues can have salutary effects in 
educational contexts. In the following section, I consider several of these intellectual 
virtues by drawing attention to their personal and social significance. I also draw from 
John Dewey’s less well-known work, How we Think.56  
Open-mindedness is perhaps the most commonly cited intellectual virtue in the 
literature. One who possesses this virtue, according to Montmarquet, “must tend to see 
others’ ideas as having at least a certain initial plausibility. He or she must be more than 
open, relative to what strikes them as initially plausible; they must have at least some 
initial tendency to see others’ ideas as plausible.”57 The open-minded person 
demonstrates a kind of epistemic humility or willingness to admit her own fallibility. We 
all know persons whose ideas are fixed and inflexible, even when contrary evidence 
presents itself. Such behavior inhibits their capacity to attain epistemic goods like 
understanding, wisdom, and knowledge because they simply refuse to change their 
minds or revise their beliefs. Open-minded persons, on the other hand, are disposed to 
listen to counter-evidence and revise their beliefs if necessary. John Dewey highlights 
how open-mindedness is integral to the process of intellectual discovery.  
Mental play is open-mindedness, faith in the power of thought to preserve 
its own integrity without external supports and arbitrary restrictions. 
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Hence free mental play involves seriousness, the earnest following of the 
development of subject-matter. It is incompatible with carelessness or 
flippancy, for it exacts accurate noting of every result reached in order 
that every conclusion may be put to further use. What is termed the 
interest in truth for its own sake is certainly a serious matter, yet this pure 
interest in truth coincides with love of the free play of thought.58 
For Dewey, an open-minded person is one who gives his mind free reign to explore, and 
this entails two other intellectual virtues: a love of knowledge and conscientiousness. 
The lover of knowledge is one who values obtaining deeper understanding, knowledge, 
and experiences. This is a person who cares about improving the veracity of her beliefs 
and is serious and is exacting in her study.  
Finally, the social significance of open-mindedness is evident when we consider 
how two societies would differ if one were populated by open-minded citizens and the 
other with close-minded citizens. Although no earthly domain consists entirely of one or 
the other, it stands to reason that a society that listens to each other, that values open 
discourse and the exchange of ideas, is a society that probably flourishes intellectually. It 
is a society wherein solutions to important social issues and problems are honestly 
addressed. 
 In our intellectual lives (as with the rest of life) we are sometime faced with real 
or apparent dangers. We may face dilemmas with respect to what to believe about 
religion, politics, controversial social issues, and the like. These situations will 
sometimes put us at odds with other members of our school, community, or family. Such 
events can be personally challenging a may call for a courageous response, or cautious 
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reservation of judgment. These related intellectual virtues, however, depend upon the 
right sort of motivation. Roberts and Wood write: 
So courageous actions need not be overall virtuous; they are virtuous 
insofar as they are courageous, since courage is a virtue; but to be overall 
virtuous, they need to be motivated by some virtuous motive. And this 
will mean that some virtue other than courage has to motivate the 
courageous action: justice, compassion, generosity, love of knowledge.59 
Courageousness acts in accordance with other—often more fundamental—intellectual 
virtues. Sometimes the best course of action is to boldly face a threat, and to confront it 
despite the possibility that we may suffer negative consequences. At other times it might 
be best to exercise caution and to refrain from committing oneself too quickly.  
Again Dewey offers a similar observation about courage and caution in his 
discussion on the importance of inference: “Since inference goes beyond what is actually 
present, it involves a leap, a jump, the propriety of which cannot be absolutely warranted 
in advance, no matter what precautions be taken. Its control is indirect, on the one hand, 
involving the formation of habits of mind which are at once enterprising and cautious.”60 
These habits of mind including an enterprising (open-minded and courageous) spirit, but 
one constrained by caution and seriousness. He explains, “Since suspended belief, or the 
postponement of a final conclusion pending further evidence, depends partly upon the 
presence of rival conjectures as to the best course to pursue…[the] cultivation of a 
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variety of alternative suggestions is an important factor in good thinking.”61 Dewey 
again stresses the importance of open-mindedness by noting that exposure to rival 
viewpoints is integral to virtuous thinking. 
From a societal standpoint, courage and caution are integral to the political 
process. Taking a stand, holding fast to principles, yet knowing when to back down are 
characteristics that we look for in political leaders. Likewise, social activists often 
display intellectual courage when confronting majority opinions. They write songs and 
poetry, hold demonstrations, and so forth. These bold proclamations involve moral 
commitments that demand intellectual virtues like courage and caution. The relationship 
between courage and caution, however, illustrates the importance of another intellectual 
virtue—practical wisdom. 
 Practical wisdom is a crucial epistemic virtue, but one not normally treated as 
such. Joseph Dunne explains,  
[Phronesis] is eccentric first of all in not lying comfortably on either side 
of the division that Aristotle himself makes between ‘intellectual’ and 
‘ethical’ virtues. It is officially designated an intellectual virtue, but its 
deep involvement with the other side of the divide is evident from the fact 
that not only is it required to complete each ethical virtue by providing 
the element of judgment indispensable to the concrete exercise of the 
latter, but conversely…ethical virtue is itself required for phronesis. If a 
clever person is not good, neither will he be a phronimos (practically wise 
person).62  
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Despite its “deep involvement” with moral virtues (indeed, its necessity) it has largely 
been ignored in the context of intellectual virtues. Linda Zagzebski, however, argues that 
it has implications for the intellectual life as well. In particular, she argues that phronesis 
is integral to moral virtue and intellectual virtue. 63 It is a “higher order, mediating virtue, 
operating over the entire range of moral and intellectual virtues.”64 Roberts and Wood go 
one step further, claiming “The distinction…between the intellectual (theoretical versus 
practical reason, contemplative versus practical wisdom) is ill-drawn, because the 
intellectual life is fully as much a matter of practices as any other part of life.”65 This 
seems correct and the notion of “practice” draws attention to the need for practical 
wisdom. We routinely make intellectual choices; we lead discussions, respond to 
criticisms, interpret, and so forth. To do these things well, I maintain, involves an ability 
to skillfully and wisely adjudicate.  
Indeed, a regulative virtue epistemology is one that depends upon the ability to 
adjudicate wisely—to discern the best course action with respect to one’s cognitive life. 
This is not always easy. For example, two intellectual virtues might produce conflicting 
motivations. My motive to arrive at a just conclusion might conflict with my sense of 
compassion. Practical wisdom helps an individuals discern the proper intellectual course 
of action. This may involve assessing the entirety of a situation, drawing from 
experience and previous knowledge, making judgments and acting upon those judgments 
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in a manner that bears the stamp of practical wisdom. Thus, a practically wise person is 
one who consistently does this, and a practically wise society is one in which community 
members judiciously negotiate their intellectual differences.  
 What the intellectual virtues just discussed share in common is that they describe 
dispositions that excellent knowers possess—dispositions that are personally and 
communally valuable. Although some will recoil at the binary relationship between 
virtue and vice (the repudiation of binaries is a common theme in postmodern thought), 
it is instructive to consider the difference between the two. Consider the following 
passage from Jane Goodall’s biography. Here she describes her apprenticeship to Louis 
Leakey—a fellow primatologist and a man she deeply respected for his personal 
scholarship. 
How could I possibly be considered suitable for such an important study? 
I had no training, no degree. But Louis didn’t care about academic 
credentials. In fact, he told me, he preferred that his chosen researcher 
should go into the field with a mind unbiased by scientific theory. What 
he had been looking for was someone with an open mind, with a passion 
for knowledge, with a love of animals, and with monumental patience. 
Someone, moreover, who was hardworking and would be able to stay 
long periods away from civilization, for he believed the study would take 
several years.66  
In this short passage, Goodall lauds several intellectual virtues. Among these, she 
includes open-mindedness, love of knowledge, compassion, patience, and diligence. 
These are traits Goodall deems important for scholarly (epistemic) activity. If, however, 
we alter this passage to include vices (traits descriptive of poor epistemic agents) a 
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different picture emerges—one in which Leaky seeks a biased, close-minded, apathetic 
and lazy researcher who despises animals and is monumentally impatient. It is doubtful 
that any scholar would actively seek out such a person. The reason is simple: On multiple 
levels this person would fail in her epistemic duties because she does not possess the 
right character traits and appropriate motivations for serious scholarship. In short—we 
might doubt her trustworthiness. 
 Finally, the intellectual virtues are more than a handbook for thinking or a 
sort of reference guide. Although they can provide this sort of referential guidance, it 
is important to remember that the virtues are character traits that are deeply embedded 
within persons. They describe something about us, and have a motivational 
component; they energize us to cognize in certain ways. Zagzebski explains, 
“[Intellectual virtues] are forms of motivation to have cognitive contact with reality, 
where this includes more than what is usually expressed by saying that people desire 
truth.”67 She extends motivation to include other epistemic goods like achieving 
understanding, and notes that some intellectual virtues may aim specifically at targets 
other than truth. Roberts and Wood make similar remarks. They argue that the 
intellectual virtue of love of knowledge, for example, has a strong motivational basis. 
Referring to it as a “disposition of the will,” they define love of knowledge as “an 
interest in understanding, an eagerness for acquaintance, a desire for significant 
                                                
67. Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical 
Foundations of Knowledge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 167. 
 
 45 
information and the solid support of actual or possible beliefs.”68 Love of knowledge 
compels persons to seek out and acquire knowledge, understanding, and acquaintance. 
In this respect, like other intellectual virtues, it motivates persons.  
CONCLUSION 
 Regulative virtue epistemology emerges out of a particular intellectual and 
cultural context—as noted, the Western intellectual tradition. Following Edmund 
Gettier’s influential article, debates about the nature and structure of justification grew 
increasing narrow and sophisticated. Some, including Ernest Sosa and Linda 
Zagzebski, attempted to circumvent these apparent impasses by shifting their 
philosophical analyses from beliefs to persons. Others followed their lead and the 
discipline of VE became, I believe, an important sub-discipline in epistemology. 
These virtue-based theories attempted to understand knowledge and related epistemic 
goods in roughly two ways—narrow and wide approaches. The RVE advanced in this 
dissertation develops out of this latter tradition. Several intellectual virtues were 
considered as well, and it was argued that these have both personal and social 
significance. Finally, it was noted that intellectual virtues have a motivational 
component; they drive us to think and act in virtuous ways. In the following chapter, I 
consider how knowledge has been understood in education and, in the final chapter, I 
return to the concept of RVE and consider how it might clarify our thinking about the 
epistemic purposes of education.  
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CHAPTER III 
KNOWLEDGE AND EDUCATION: 
HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS* 
 
In the preceding chapter, I covered the field of epistemology from 
approximately 1960 to present day work in virtue epistemology (VE). In this chapter, I 
consider how knowledge has been discussed in education during roughly the same time 
frame. In fact, knowledge has garnered considerable attention in contemporary 
educational theory. Theorists have drawn from traditions as diverse as positivism and 
postmodernism, and debates—sometimes quite lively—have served notice that there is 
little agreement across theoretical borders. Despite this variety (and the sometimes-
contentious nature of these disagreements) most scholars would likely agree that 
knowledge continues to be an important topic in education. I begin by identify a key 
turning point in educational theorizing about knowledge—the reconceptualization. 
Here I analyze the historical and conceptual development of present-day educational 
theory, noting that an epistemic shift has taken place in curriculum studies. This 
discussion also serves as a foundation for explicating three important educational 
theories that espouse an “epistemology”—that is, a theory of knowledge. This 
conceptual analysis provides brief but accurate picture of present day “theory” in 
education. Along the way I note some points-of-contact between these theoretical  
______________ 
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orientations and VE. This account—along with Chapter II—will serve as a foundation 
for understanding how RVE clarifies the epistemic purposes of education. I conclude 
by noting some analogous developments in the fields of curriculum studies and 
epistemology. 
CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT AND THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION 
Curriculum development—as a distinct field within education—begins in the 
early 20th century with the work of John Franklin Bobbitt. Bobbitt sought to link 
school curriculum to the daily lives of students through a technique called activity 
analysis.69 Briefly, activity analysis involved monitoring the daily routines of high 
performing professionals. What they do (and how they do it) becomes a form of data 
from which curricula can be derived. Others followed Bobbitt’s lead and the field of 
curriculum development slowly emerged as a distinct discipline in education. By the 
time Ralph Tyler published his curriculum development manifesto in 1949, it seemed 
the field has truly emerged as a central field of study in education, and for the next 
couple of decades the bulk of curriculum literature built upon or revolved around 
Tyler’s foundation.  
However, the 1960s and 70s were a tumultuous time in curriculum studies—a 
period that represents a radical shift away from the traditional understanding of the 
curriculum scholar's work. The first shot rang out in 1969 with Joseph Schwab's 
incendiary piece, "The Practical: A Language for Curriculum." Here he offered two 
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criticisms of the curriculum field and a prediction. First, he evocatively declared the 
field "...moribund, unable to present methods and principles to continue its work and 
desperately in search of new and more effective principles and methods."70 In 1976, 
Dwayne Huebner endorsed Schwab’s assessment, claiming that the so-called unifying 
banner of curriculum development was no longer sustainable. He writes, “Let us 
acknowledge its demise, gather at the wake, celebrate joyously what our forebears 
made possible—and then disperse to do our work, because we are no longer members 
of one household.”71 William Pinar suggests that field attained this ineffectual state (in 
part) due to the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957. Fear that the United States was 
losing its position of dominance in the world prompted the Kennedy administration to 
initiate the curriculum reform movement. Curriculum specialists were passed over in 
favor of Discipline-specific specialists. Pinar claims that “by the late 1960s curriculum 
as a field, weakened by being overlooked by federal curriculum reform efforts and 
affected by declining enrollments, was vulnerable to attack.”72  
Second, Schwab claimed the field was stubbornly wedded to the Tyler 
Rationale, such that research had come to be little more than a regurgitation of 
inadequate and worn out methods. For decades, curriculum specialists worked to build 
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upon the foundation laid in 1949 by Ralph Tyler in his highly influential book, Basic 
Principles of Curriculum and Instruction.73 Here he stressed a rational approach to 
developing curriculum, what has come to be known as the Tyler rationale. This 
approach emphasized setting learning objectives, designing curriculum, establishing 
scopes and sequences, and the development of objective evaluation methods. The role 
of the curriculum developer in this scheme was that of advisor; scholars should work 
hand-in-hand with practitioners and schools to develop comprehensive plans of action.  
Following these critiques of the curriculum development, Schwab predicted 
that the curriculum field would undergo a renaissance. Perhaps not in the way he 
imagined, nevertheless, his prophecy certainly came true in the academy. During the 
late 1960s and early 1970s a new generation of curriculum theorists—including James 
McDonald, Paul Klohr, Bill Pinar, Janet Miller, and Dwayne Heubner—began to call 
for a large-scale reconceptualization of curriculum studies. Janet Miller identifies the 
beginning of the reconceptualization movement with the “Curriculum Theory 
Frontiers” at Ohio State University in 1967, and roots its ongoing influence in the 
establishment of the Journal of Curriculum Theorizing (JCT) and the “Bergamo” 
conference in Dayton, Ohio.74 With new venues in which to publish and present work, 
the curriculum field saw an explosion of theoretically diverse attempts re-think 
curriculum. Drawing from a range of disciples (e.g., literary theory, hermeneutics, neo-
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Marxism, and autobiography), many scholars shifted their focus from development and 
implementation, to a resolve to understand the deeper theoretical issues underpinning 
the once-straightforward business of curriculum.  
The legacy of the reconceptualization of curriculum studies has largely been 
confined to the university setting. This much is evident from recent legislation, 
including Goals 2000 (1994), No Child Left Behind (2001), and president Obama’s 
“Race to the Top” (2010). These modern-day instantiations of the Tyler Rationale 
indicate that the curriculum development model is thoroughly entrenched in the 
American concept of education. Nevertheless, recent reconceptualist work has 
attempted to reclaim curriculum development. Patrick Slattery, Joe Kincheloe, and 
Shirley Steinberg, contributed to a volume that aimed at precisely this. They describe a 
reconceptualized curriculum development model in the following way: 
We recommend an inclusive, contextual and autobiographical model for 
teaching, learning and assessment because we believe that the context of 
education can no longer be minimized, as traditional programs have 
done. We support the reconceptualized definition of curriculum and 
instruction that values all of the experiences teachers and students bring 
to bear on institutional schooling: classroom activities, extracurricular 
clubs and teams, cocurricular events, family experiences, peer group 
initiations….75 
Although some schools have embraced a reconceptualized curriculum and instruction 
model of this sort, the authors are quick to note that such attempts are controversial.  
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As noted above, however, the reconceptualization has had its greatest impact on 
academic study of curriculum. Janet Miller writes: 
Many people associated with the reconceptualizing of the US 
curriculum field have worked for more than twenty-five years to move 
the field away from its long-standing managerial, technocratic, and 
positivist orientation, and toward multivocal, multiperspectival 
theorizings of curriculum. Contemporary curriculum theorists have 
moved from either neo-Marxist or phenomenological and existential 
orientations that characterized much of early reconceptualist inquiry 
into a riotous array of theoretical perspective that point to expansive and 
complex conceptions of curriculum reconceptualized.76 
The early work of the reconceptualists, then, promulgated a new zeitgeist in university-
based curriculum studies—one in which intellectual exploration has become the norm. 
It is “riotous” in that the sheer scope of topics, theories, and perspectives under 
consideration resist easy categorization. Terms like “postmodern,” “constructive,” and 
“critical” may hint at an orientation, but they also mask enormous perspectival variety. 
In summary, the reconceptualization was (and continues to be) a monumental shift 
from practical/bureaucratic attempts to structure a curriculum “that works,” to a 
theoretical model that aims for political, ideological, and philosophical understanding. 
But the reconceptualization had another effect: it signaled an epistemic shift in 
curriculum theorizing. 
EPISTEMIC SHIFTS IN EDUCATIONAL THEORY 
 The dramatic shift initiated by the reconceptualization was, in fact, an 
epistemic shift. Knowledge had been conceived of in largely instrumental language; it 
was the content, the subject matter, the body of relevant information deemed worthy of 
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study by curriculum specialists. Maxine Greene notes that scholars like Bloom, 
Schwab, and Tyler (among others) adopted “a type of scientism or positivism” in their 
work.77 Their theories and “rationales,” in other words, assumed that knowledge is (1) 
the product of rational systematic (read: scientific) investigation, and (2) reliable 
insofar as it is securely fastened to a proper epistemic foundation (empirical 
observation). While many still endorse a view of knowledge of this sort (e.g., 
advocates of quantitative research) Green is quick to point out that “Changing 
epistemological orientations, now increasingly evident in research institutes and 
organizations, are generating new reflectiveness about the constructs in use in 
particular situations and about what can be conceptualized and can expand the areas in 
which research is done.”78 These new epistemological “orientations” were partially 
noted earlier—phenomenology, critical theory, existentialism, and the like—and they 
continue to be “conceptualized” in contemporary curriculum theory. The following 
discussion addresses some specific theories that have emerged in the post-
reconceptualization era.  
 Over the past few decades, several epistemological orientations have garnered 
considerable attention. These are divisible into three broad categories: Anti-realist 
epistemologies, critical epistemologies, and realist epistemologies—although boundary 
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crossing does occur.79 The goal is to clarify the theories of knowledge endorsed by 
several theoretical orientations that fall roughly under these categories. The aim is to 
provide a straightforward account of their epistemological assumptions.  
Anti-realist Educational Epistemologies 
The term, anti-realist, is far-reaching. One can be an anti-realist about some or 
all of the following: physical entities, morals, the past, the future, other minds, 
universals, and so on. Alvin Plantinga provides the follow concise description of anti-
realism: 
The core of…anti-realism is the idea that objects in the world owe their 
fundamental structure—and, if they couldn’t exist without displaying 
that structure, their existence—to our creative activity. The world as it is 
in itself, apart from this structuring activity, doesn’t display any of these 
features. The idea is that if there were no persons (or if there were some 
and they didn’t structure the world in the way in which we do in fact 
structure it) then there would be no objects in space or time, none 
displaying object property structure, no number of things of any sort, 
and the like.80 
Plantinga makes two relevant observations here: (1) the mind is responsible for 
structuring and ordering experience, and (2) without this mental activity these objects 
would have no fundamental ordering or structure whatsoever. Each position outlined 
below is (according to its own logic) anti-realist; each is dubious of “objective” 
knowledge claims about the actual state-of-affairs outside the activity of the mind. 
Constructivism 
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Although constructivism takes many forms—some quite radical, others 
relatively moderate—it usually denies the traditional conception of knowledge as 
justified true belief. Instead, most constructivists endorse an explicitly anti-realist 
thesis that (1) knowledge is constructed by an individual or society, because (2) there 
is no shared reality to which our beliefs about the world correspond. Put differently, 
individuals interpret and give meaning to the world around them. A socially 
constructed reality emerges when persons share their realities with one another. Thus, 
the apparently well-ordered world we inhabit is the product of collective social 
construction. However, both (1) and (2) are subject to multiple interpretations. In what 
follows I consider two varieties of constructivism: moderate and radical.  
In its moderate form, constructivism stresses the subjective nature of 
experience; learners are encouraged to construct their own representations of reality. 
Several important figures in the history of education have endorsed a variety of 
moderate constructivism, e.g., Jerome Bruner, John Dewey, Jean Piaget, and Lev 
Vygotsky. Piaget, for example, has been particularly influential in educational theory. 
He argued that knowledge is internalized by way of assimilation and accommodation. 
Assimilation refers to the process whereby new experiences are integrated into our 
existing knowledge framework.81 Suppose I read a novel by Tolstoy. As I work 
through the text, I encounter new ideas and interesting passages. These are assimilated 
into my pre-existing network of knowledge. My mind then takes a further step to 
accommodate this new knowledge. Thus, accommodation is a “re-framing” of my 
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“mental representations of the external world.”82 It follows that one’s mind is always 
in the process of changing. I would quibble with some of the moderate constructivist’s 
conclusions, especially the strain of moral relativism some endorse. Nevertheless, the 
basic observation that persons are consciously and subconsciously altering their 
understandings of the world is a powerful concept for education.  
Moderate constructivism is also divisible into two rough varieties. Cognitive 
constructivism is the view that our mental structures are responsible for actively 
creating knowledge. As such, constructivist educators are particularly interested in 
cognitive development, and the process of learning—not its product.83 Social 
constructivists, on the other hand, are concerned with the role of language and culture. 
They assert that education ought to “challenge learners to question, draw connections, 
reflect, communicate, negotiate, evaluate viewpoints, outline problems, acquire and 
use evidence, and generate new knowledge….”—each of these in the context of local 
and global community. Indeed, some believe that social constructivism holds the 
potential to improve society.84 Here we see the influence of John Dewey’s pragmatic 
philosophy of education on constructivist (and postmodern) theories of knowledge 
construction.  
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In Democracy and Education, Dewey writes, “In schools, those under 
instruction are too customarily looked upon as acquiring knowledge as theoretical 
spectators, minds which appropriate knowledge by direct energy of intellect. The very 
word pupil has almost come to mean one who is engaged not in having fruitful 
experiences but in absorbing knowledge directly. Something which is called mind or 
consciousness is severed from the physical organs of activity.”85 Dewey, like 
constructivists, views the acquisition of knowledge as a constructive and ongoing 
process. One does not simply learn, but one is always learning. As noted in the previous 
chapter, however, Dewey is also concerned with the habits of the mind—characteristics 
like open-mindedness, courage, caution, and love of knowledge. Here we see an 
important connection between Deweyan constructivism and regulative virtue 
epistemology: our cognitive character shapes our constructive activities. Fruitful 
discussion can and ought to be had concerning these connections. 
In its radical and overtly more philosophical form, however, constructivism 
denies the existence of a mind-independent external world to which any knowledge 
claims correspond. In other words, the radical constructivist holds that we do not co-
inhabit a physical world that exists independently of our minds. Rather, we literally 
create the world of objects (and persons) that present themselves to our perceptual 
faculties. Von Glasersfeld is among the most influential advocates of this view. He 
writes: 
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With the construction of permanent objects, the cognitive subject 
crystallizes some of the repeatable items it has constructed and treats 
them as external and independent. Thus a distinction arises that covers 
much of the organism/environment distinction by creating a ‘subjective’ 
environment. The externalized permanent objects now ‘exist’ in an 
external world structured by the spatial and temporal relations that have 
been abstracted from the objects as they were experienced.86  
First, there is no independently existing, extra-mental world from which these mental 
representations derive their form and content. The immense panorama of our reality 
(persons, places, things, etc.) is constituted solely by our minds.87 Persons make the 
external world; they make other persons. For example, the keyboard upon which I am 
typing is clearly and distinctly before me. I see it and know that I see it, but this is only 
so because at some point I willed, thought, or endorsed the keyboard into existence. It 
now inhabits my external world. Second, von Glasersfeld’s position is necessarily a 
form of relativism. This is the logical consequence of removing the possibility that we 
share a common world. Both points warrant scrutiny.  
 First, the view that there is not a knowable external world creates a problem for 
the radical constructivist: How is it possible that our minds have any content at all? If 
we reject the notion that the mind engages with an external reality, the radical 
constructivist needs to explain where the content of our minds comes from (e.g., ideas, 
opinions, memories, visual representations etc.). In other words, how does a mind born 
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in complete darkness and isolation understand light? Furthermore, in cutting off access 
to the external world, we cut ourselves off from much more than trees, rocks, and 
birds; we cut ourselves off from other people. Why, then, should I concern myself with 
the suffering of others who putatively are little more than ideas or mental projections? 
In this respect, Von Glasersfeld’s constructivism is also profoundly relativistic. It is 
difficult to see how it could be otherwise because he adopts “fact-constructivism”—a 
distinction made by Paul Boghossian.88 Boghossian maintains that if we rid ourselves 
of an external set of facts, then the content of even the most banal propositions (e.g., 
There are mountains in Africa.) are utterly contingent. This is extremely problematic, 
especially when our propositions concern the wellbeing of others: For example, “Rape 
of children is morally wrong.” The usual arguments made by relativists to condemn 
such heinous acts do not aid von Glasersfeld. Other children, he is forced to say, do not 
even exist. 
Postmodernism 
 Postmodernism, often used interchangeably with Poststructuralism and 
methodologically tied to deconstructionism, is another anti-realist theory that has 
garnered considerable attention in education over the past few decades. Two of the 
foremost contemporary curriculum theorists—Patrick Slattery and William Doll—have 
endorsed poststructural approaches as modes of inquiry that open new possibilities for 
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understanding the present-day educational landscape.89 Doll, for example, predicts that 
a “new sense of educational order will emerge, as will new relations between teachers 
and students, culminating in a new concept of curriculum.”90 Reeder elaborates on the 
postmodern turn in education. “Postmodern thinking promulgates a new paradigm of 
holism, one imbued with concepts of relationship, self-organization, recursion, order 
emerging from chaos, and meaning making.”91 But Usher and Edwards are careful to 
note that postmodernism resists easy explanation. “There is a sense, anyhow, in which 
it is impossible to fully define the postmodern since the very attempt to do so confers 
upon it a status and identity which it must necessarily oppose.”92 Rather, the terms 
postmodern, postmodernism, and postmodernity are “loose umbrella term[s] under 
whose broad cover can be encompassed at one and the same time a condition, a set of 
practices, a cultural discourse, an attitude and a mode of analysis.”93 In short, to 
systematize postmodernism is to miss the point of postmodernism. Thus, the following 
analysis aims only at approximation—fully aware that codification reifies exactly that 
which postmodernity repudiates. Nevertheless, if, as its advocates maintain, 
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postmodernism is a new way of thinking about education, what does it have to say 
about knowledge? 
At root postmodernism is deeply suspicious of so-called modernist meta or 
grand narratives about knowing and knowledge. It is argued that these narratives 
describe or frame the world in a static unchanging language that simply cannot 
represent the shifting nature of reality. Instead, postmodern thought starts with the 
assumption that the structures, systems, and relationships that underpin modernist 
accounts of reality are wholly contingent and fluid. Richard Rorty, for example, 
presents a postmodern theory of knowledge that denies that we have direct access to 
reality—that is, the way things are independent of the mind. Rather, he argues that 
knowledge (and epistemology) ought to be replaced with “hope” in better ways of 
believing. He warns, "One should stop worrying about whether what one believes is well 
grounded and start worrying about whether one has been imaginative enough to think up 
interesting alternatives to one's present beliefs"94  
Once we abandon the fruitless search for objective reality, we can devote 
ourselves to making our beliefs more efficacious than they were before. We can do this 
because we have given up truth-as-correspondence, and have embraced the claim that 
what makes a belief right is just that experience has taught us that it works. In short, 
because our claims to truth (and thus knowledge) refer to utter contingent accounts of 
reality, it follows that they are only contextually true. As such, any claim to an 
invariant foundation (an objectively knowable external world, for example) for 
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knowledge is met with skepticism. Instead, knowledge ought to be concerned with the 
local and specific (contextual) rather than the context-free and totalizing general. 
There are, of course, numerous postmodern perspectives in educational theory. 
Patti Lather has argued for the method of deconstruction in approaching educational 
issues and research. According to Lather, the goal of deconstruction “is to keep things 
in process, to disrupt, to keep the system in play, to set up procedures to continuously 
demystify the realities we create, to fight the tendency for our categories to congeal.”95 
Many, if not all, postmodernists would agree with Lather’s insistence that we 
deconstruct the binaries and categories that permeate education. Nevertheless, some 
have called for “constructive” elements in postmodernism. Patrick Slattery describes 
his own constructive approach that “seeks to integrate the best features of premodern 
rural, agrarian societies (such as spirituality, cosmology, and family/tribal community 
values) in order to construct a more balanced and ecologically sustainable global 
community.”96 And still others address educational issues through a postmodern 
reading of scientific development. William Doll’s work in chaos theory typifies this 
approach.97 Likewise, others have focused their attentions on ecological issues. Chet 
bowers, for example, works to create a postmodern theory of ecological justice rooted 
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in a sense of generational and biotic connectedness.98 I sum, there are innumerable 
positions available to the postmodern theorist. What binds many of them together is a 
strong sense of justice: ecological justice, economic justice, and social justice. Virtue 
epistemologists also give place to justice, counting it among the intellectual virtues.  
Postmodernists question correspondence theories about the nature of reality, 
but they also de-centered conventional wisdom about the self. Michel Foucault writes, 
“Where the soul pretends unification or the self fabricates a coherent identity, the 
genealogist sets out to study the beginning—numberless beginnings, whose faint traces 
and hints of color are readily seen by a historical eye.”99 For Foucault, what one knows 
is not the product of a single curious soul, but knowledge is filtered through a 
fragmented set of identities. This point is echoed in Deborah’s Britzman’s feminist 
critique of fixed concepts of self. She argues, “Identity is examined as a discursive 
effect of the social, constituted through identifications.”100 Society, as such, plays the 
key role in the constitution of these multiple identifications. She goes on to note, 
“because identification is a partial, contradictory, and ambivalent relation with aspects 
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of objects or dynamics of others, it may be thought of as a means to make and direct 
desire.”101 Two important points emerge from this assessment.  
First, there is no single self-identity, but a whole host of identities in constant 
negotiation with the social world. Queer theorists and feminists have found this 
observation particularly helpful in their respective studies of gender and sexuality. The 
concept of an “essential self”—one that is gendered male or female—is traded for self 
that is socially constituted. This leads to the second point. For postmodernists, 
knowledge and power are intimately linked in the self-identification process. Again, 
queer theorists and feminists argue that powerful social forces bracket what counts as a 
legitimate self-identity. Thus, attempts are made to transgress these social 
constructions—to decenter the power/knowledge relationship. What (even how) one 
comes to know something becomes extremely ambiguous. But far from unnerving 
postmodernist, this ambiguity about reality and self-identity is celebrated for its 
liberatory force.  
Finally, while virtue epistemologists might not share the postmodernists 
metaphysical commitments, many wide virtue epistemologists are also unimpressed by 
attempts to build logical systems. Lorrain Code’s feminist virtue epistemology,102 and 
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Roberts and Woods regulative epistemology are prime examples.103 Wood, for 
example, claims that many themes in postmodern thought are echoed in VE. He writes, 
Any suitably chastened epistemology for a postmodern age must reckon 
not just with the limitations imposed upon reason by time, place, and 
language, but also with those darker forces of pride, power, economic 
advantage, and idolatry that subvert reason and keep us from the truth 
and other desirable ends of intellectual activity. Of course, such 
concerns are not incidental to virtue epistemology, but integral to it.104 
Virtue epistemology of this sort recognizes that the world is a complex place—a place 
full of conflicting and competing ideas. It also assumes that intellectual character 
directly shapes how this world is perceived. I contend that the open-minded, 
intellectually courageous and honest person—in short, the virtuous knower—is better 
equipped to handle the rigors of intellectual life in the 21st century. 
Critical Epistemologies 
The Frankfurt and Birmingham Schools of Critical Theory 
 Several important theoretical orientations fall under the critical category—a 
term first coined by Max Horkheimer. The goal of critical theory, according to 
Horkheimer is “to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them.”105 
This description is wide enough to cover all the perspectives under consideration here; 
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however, each of these has its own distinctive characteristics that are worth discussing. 
It is also important to keep in mind that critical approaches emphasize the binding of 
theory and action. That is, a person’s theorizing is also a call to action, and thus critical 
approaches are generally overtly political in nature. I begin this section with a brief 
introduction to two forms of traditional critical theory, followed by a discussion of 
critical race theory and critical feminist epistemology.  
Steeped in its Marxist roots, traditional critical theory is divisible into two 
broad foci: the critical social theory of the Frankfurt School, and approaches centered 
on the study hegemony vis-à-vis the Birmingham School. The Frankfurt School of 
critical theory designates several generations of social theorists and philosophers. Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno originated critical theory. Their main concern was 
that the “systematic pursuit of enlightened reason and freedom had the ironic long-
term effect of engendering new forms of irrationality and repression.”106 These 
pathologies, or mass distortions of rationality, made it impossible for members of 
society to realize their own potential and freedom. Stephen K. White points out that, 
while large audiences never embraced early critical theory, their trenchant critique did 
undermine the “prevailing interpretations of reason, progress, nature, and 
subjectivity,”107 and engendered suspicion and a greater degree of questioning. Instead, 
Horkheimer and Adorno sought to “to transform contemporary capitalism into a 
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consensual form of social life.”108 This involved illuminating the repressive ideologies 
responsible for this wholesale blindness, and providing an alternative paradigm based on 
social rationality. In its current iteration, Jürgen Habermas argues for the creation of a 
democratic public sphere of discourse reminiscent of the salons and coffee houses of 18th 
century London. Habermas’ public sphere is a “conceptual resource…in which political 
participation is enacted through the medium of talk.”109 It is a site where persons can 
deliberate about important matters outside the purview of the state, indeed, where the 
state can be held up for critical analysis. In the language of virtue—it is a sphere in 
which discussants engage in open-minded discourse. 
The Birmingham School of critical theory, like the Frankfurt School, takes 
Marxism as its point of departure. The aim of Birmingham School critical theory, 
however, differs from the Frankfurt School. Following Antonio Gramsci, scholars in this 
tradition explore how cultural productions (e.g., film, political discourse, music, and so 
forth) serve to subjugate persons—what Gramsci calls hegemony. "For Gramsci, this 
was necessary because the ruling classes occupied a hegemonic position; that is, through 
their control of social, cultural, and political forces, the ruling classes were able to attain 
the consent of the working classes to capitalism and thus to their own domination."110 
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Just as Marxists were concerned with the distribution of the means of production, 
Gramsci and his followers saw similar nefarious forces at work in the production of 
culture.  
 Gramsci’s social theory was adopted by several notable figures associated with the 
University of Birmingham’s Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (1964-2002)—a 
collective of persons working in the area of critical theory, including Raymond 
Williams, Stuart Hall, Richard Dyer, and Paul Willis. Binding them together was a 
common belief that cultural hegemony needed to be exposed. The themes addressed by 
those in this critical tradition are multiple. Slattery notes, “Birmingham School scholars 
work with hegemony as a lens for understanding working class lives and speech, 
resistances in youth culture, meanings of alternative cultural styles, and dominant (yet 
invisible) white, heterosexual, and masculine cultural representations.”111 The 
Birmingham School has to varying degrees influenced numerous educational theorists, 
e.g., Henry Giroux, Jean Anyon, and Michael Apple. The most influential of these is 
Paulo Freire, whose book—Pedagogy of the Oppressed—remains one of the most cited 
works in educational literature.112 Each of these theorists has employed a critical 
approach, often under the moniker “critical pedagogy,” in their scholarly work. Paul 
Willis’ seminal ethnographical book, Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids get 
Working Class Jobs, is an excellent and illustrative example critical theory applied to 
educational issues.  
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 The aim of Willis’ study was to understand how the pattern of educational failure 
was maintained within this educational community. Thus, he analyzed the lives of 12 
working-class “lads,” attending “Hammertown School.” Stanley Aronowitz provides the 
following summary of his findings: 
[Willis] shows how kids, through their won activity and ideological 
development, reproduce themselves as working class. The mechanism is 
their opposition to authority, their refusal to submit to the imperatives of a 
curriculum that encourages social mobility through acquisition of 
credentials. Thus, Willis opposes the manipulation thesis of radical 
critiques with the finding, based upon careful ethnographic methodology, 
that working class “lads” create their own culture of resistance to school 
knowledge. Or, to be more exact, truancy, counterculture, and disruption 
of the intended reproductive outcomes of the curriculum and pedagogy of 
schools yield an ironic effect: the “lads” disqualify themselves from the 
opportunity to enter middle class jobs…the student produce themselves as 
rebellious, “uneducated” workers whose single choice is the unskilled and 
semi-skilled occupations found in manual labor.113 
Even through their own attempts at resistance, these students effectively reified a 
cultural narrative about their own “place” in the world. Willis notes, “This hegemony 
of commonsense surrounds them all the time. It is partly self-created and partly 
produced by confirmatory ideological messages downwards.”114 They are constantly 
reminded of the inevitability of “work”—that is, the hard a dreary life of the factory 
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worker. This is partly the result of self-creation and partly the product of a hegemonic 
logic that makes escape seem impossible.  
Undergirding both forms of critical theory is a particular account of knowledge. 
Habermas, for example, recognizes that the social sciences—concerned with 
subjectivities as they are—require more than the typical positivistic epistemology. 
Rather, he advocated the use of positivistic “technical” inquiry for descriptive purposes, 
and a “practical” (interpretive or hermeneutic) approach that sought understanding.115 
Together these modes of inquiry provide the epistemic basis to pursue emancipatory 
ends. Habermas’ appropriation of Freudian psychoanalysis illustrates how critical theory 
attends both subjective and empirical consideration.116 For example, the analysand is 
studied both empirically (for her symptoms and conditions) and subjectively via dialog. 
Importantly, effective psychoanalysis ideally ends with the analysand possessing 
reflective self-knowledge and greater self-control—and thus, emancipation. 
Critical Race Theory 
 Over the past 15 years increasing attention has been given to critical race theory 
(CRT) in education. Gloria Ladson-Billings, William Tate, Jim Scheurich, Garret 
Duncan, and Adrienne Dixson have each used a CRT framework for understanding race 
issues in U.S. education. Originating in the critical legal studies movement of the 1980s, 
but in presaged in the works of W.E.B. Dubois, critical race theorists are deeply 
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suspicious of the structure of legal systems in the United States. Authors like Patricia 
Williams, Richard Delgado, Kimberle Crenshaw, and Derrick Bell have each maintained 
that White supremacy and racial power have been (and continue to be) reproduced 
through U.S. laws and policies. Derrick Bell, for example, writes: 
My position is that the legal rules regarding racial discrimination have 
become not only reified (that is, ascribing material existence and power to 
what really just ideas)—as the modern inheritor of realism, critical legal 
studies, would say—but deified. The worship of equality rules as having 
absolute power benefits whites by preserving a benevolent but fictional 
self-image, and such worship benefits blacks by preserving hope. But I 
think we’ve arrived at a place in history where the harms of such worship 
outweigh its benefits.117 
The problem, as Bell suggests, is that we are living under a confortable illusion—one 
that offers Whites the scapegoat of specious sympathy, and people of color false 
promises. The truth of matters (that non-Whites remain targets of racial prejudice) is 
hidden under a number of systemic “guises.” Unsurprisingly, these guises are also 
present in education.  
Consider the issue of colorblindness. Gloria Ladson-Billings explains that the 
“colorblind” position is “evident in the way the curriculum presents people of color, 
presumes a homogenized 'we' in a celebration of diversity.”118 On the surface the 
argument for colorblindness appear innocuous, however, Ladson-Billings continues: 
“Thus, students are taught erroneously that 'we are all immigrants,' and, as a result, 
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African American, Indigenous, and Chicano students are left with the guilt of failing to 
rise above their immigrant status like 'every other group.’”119 Far from putting persons 
on an equal footing, the reduction of all person to colorless collective hides the deeper 
issues that foster racism.  
The preceding case illustrates how, embedded within the curriculum, one can 
arguably find racist structures. This has implications for a CRT theory of knowledge. 
Critical race theorists maintain that the dominant epistemology in the U.S. public 
schools is Eurocentric. They are quick to point out that there many other ways of 
knowing outside the context of the Western intellectual tradition. These include 
indigenous ways of knowing associated with tribal populations, somatic knowledge, and 
epistemologies generated in Eastern, African, or South American contexts, to name a 
few. According to CRT scholars, failing to recognize and respect these other forms of 
knowing and knowledge amounts to epistemological racism. Zamudio et al. explain that 
our unstated epistemological assumptions “guide and inform the societal ethos. That is, 
what the dominant society believes…about learning, teaching, and assessment, is nested 
within an epistemological assumption about how knowledge is acquired, whose 
knowledge is valued, how knowledge is share, and how knowledge is assessed.”120 A 
central task for CRT, then, is to advocate for a pluralistic account of knowledge in 
education. 
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Realist Epistemologies 
Realist epistemologies make up the final category considered in this chapter. 
Herein, a realist epistemology is one that holds that the external world is—to one degree 
or another—objectively knowable. As such, educational scholarship in the realist 
tradition aims to describe external phenomena in objective terms. They begin with the 
assumption that our senses and cognitive abilities are generally reliable and trustworthy, 
and that beliefs supported by sufficient evidence are should be counted as knowledge. 
The standard-bearers of realist epistemology are those in the quantitative research 
tradition.  
Research methodologies are an ongoing and hotly debated issue in education. 
On one side, researchers in the quantitative tradition continue to argue for the primacy 
of scientifically based research. They contend that scientific methodology grants 
researchers a foundation from which to make verifiable claims about phenomena 
related to teaching and learning. Indeed, they have been critical of qualitative research, 
claiming it is incomprehensible, counter-intuitive, and ineffective for gaining 
genuinely useful knowledge of educational phenomena. Diane Ravitch typifies this 
view. An outspoken advocate of scientifically based research, she imagines a scenario 
in which medical doctors are replaced with doctors of education who cannot agree 
upon a diagnosis, having no "canon" to draw upon. She concludes: "The thought 
occurred to me that educators have something to learn from physicians. Medicine, too, 
has its quacks and charlatans. But unlike educators, physicians have canons of 
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scientific validity to protect innocent patients from unproven remedies and specious 
theories.”121  
This view was articulate in the National Research Council's controversial 
report, Scientific Research in Education. Following the No Child Left Behind act 
(2001) and its mandate to pursue scientifically based research, these authors were 
given the task of providing a cogent account of what constitutes rigorous, scientifically 
based research. They identify six guiding scientific principles:122 
1. Research questions should be significant and empirically investigated. 
2. Research should be linked to relevant theories. 
3. Only methods that allow direct investigation of a question should be used. 
4. The chain of reasoning should be open to evaluation and coherent. 
5. The experiment should be replicable and generalizable. 
6. Research data and methodologies should be disclosed for evaluation. 
Several epistemic assumption are embedded within these principles: objective 
knowledge-claims are possible via scientific principles of investigation; existing 
theories are useful insofar as they reliably lead one to knowledge; true beliefs are 
replicable and thus generalizable; and true research outcomes will display logical 
cohesiveness. In this respect they locate themselves with a positivistic tradition. In 
fact, they hold such principles to be crucial to the future of US education:  
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In today's rapidly changing economic and technological environment, 
schooling cannot be improved by relying on folk wisdom about how 
students learning and how schools should be organized. No one would 
think of designing a rocket to the moon or wiping out a widespread 
disease by relying on untested hunches; likewise, one cannot expect to 
improve education without research.123  
In short, positivistic epistemology is held to be superior to other anti-realist or critical 
epistemologies, because it resists the invalidating affects of subjectivity. But not all 
agree. 
In a recent issue of Educational Researcher, Kenneth Howe provides a critique 
of education's apparent methodological fixation with positivistic epistemology. "I 
contend that the education science question, to which the new orthodoxy has been the 
response, ought to be abandoned as currently framed because it has been addressed 
within a broad rhetorical context that presupposes a positivist conception of 
science."124 His main objection is that the "new orthodoxy"—the notion that valid 
knowledge is best arrived at via scientific methodologies—presupposes a commitment 
to positivistic epistemology. The language of the NRC report suggests his assessment 
is correct.  
Most of the criticisms of positivistic/post-positivistic research methodology 
have come from the qualitative research tradition. Scholars in this tradition have 
sought to problematize what they understand to be a naïve and ultimately hegemonic 
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dependence on science. Denzin and Lincoln describe this general sentiment. “Critics of 
the SBR movement are united on the following points. ‘Bush science’ and its 
experimental, evidence-based methodologies represent a racialized, masculinist 
backlash to the proliferation of qualitative inquiry methods over the past two 
decades.”125 They go on to provide the following generalization of the qualitative 
researcher’s alternative epistemological commitments:  
Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, 
the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and 
the situational constraints that shape inquiry. Such researchers 
emphasize the value-laden nature of inquiry. They seek answers to 
questions that stress how social experience is created and given 
meaning.126  
This passage reiterates two standard assumptions about knowledge noted in the 
discussions about constructivism and critical theory, respectively. First, reality is not a 
fixed thing, but the product of individual realities in constant negotiation with other 
realities. What emerges is a kind of holistic, socially constructed reality. Knowledge 
works in much the same way; it is not constrained by an independently existing 
external world—some fixed entity that limits what is knowable—but by the subjective 
reality of individuals. Second, the knowledge we have is inseparably tied to our 
political, cultural, and religious worldviews. This subjective bias precludes the 
possibility of objective knowledge.  
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On one hand, I believe most virtue epistemologists and (post) positivists will 
agree that the external world is some objective sense, knowable. We can make 
knowledge claims about it and those claims are constrained by how the world presents 
itself to us. Postmodernists and constructivists will naturally be skeptical of claims that 
the world presents a “unified” image of itself to persons. They are certainly right 
insofar as each person is unique and understands the world subjectively. When this 
thesis is pressed to its limit—when each person’s subjective understanding of the 
world is radically isolated and incommensurate with other subjective understandings—
this is where most virtue epistemologist will part company with postmodernism. On 
the other hand, wide virtue epistemologist and (post) positivist will disagree regarding 
the role of systematic accounts of knowledge. Wide VE is reticent to construct 
comprehensive logical systems for understanding knowledge. 
ANALOGIES IN EDUCATION AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
In conclusion, at least two analogies can be drawn curriculum studies and the 
discipline of epistemology. First, both fields experienced a foundational shift during 
roughly the same period of time. A notable difference occurs in the initial responses of 
these fields: where many curriculum theorists almost immediately embraced the 
intellectual liberty of reconceptualization, many epistemologists attempted defend or 
refine the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief. By the 1980s, 
however, several respected epistemologists had broken ranks with the establishment. 
For generations, epistemology had limited its analysis to the properties of beliefs and 
had neglected the characteristics of knowers themselves. The introduction of VE in the 
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1980s marked a redirection of focus away from the sterile qualities of beliefs and 
conditions for knowledge, and instead made the characteristics and dispositions of 
persons the subject of study.127 A similar and analogous shift occurred in curriculum 
theory. Maxine Greene’s introduction of existential perspective into the scholarly 
discourse, as well as the new emphasis on autobiographical research and 
psychoanalysis, typifies the move from outward structural concerns associated with the 
Tyler Rationale, to the inward-looking emphasis on subjective experience.128  
In both instances, greater attention is paid to persons and far less to systems, 
whether methodological, epistemological, or bureaucratic.  Likewise, both fields 
broadened the scope of their respective analyses to include new theoretical sources and 
ideas, which had hitherto been largely neglected.  William Pinar, William Reynolds, 
Patrick Slattery, and Peter Taubman, for example, state clearly their desire to open 
educational discourse to wider range of voices and perspectives—to generate 
understanding. They write, “We aspire to point to a ‘common ground’…in which 
different traditions and understandings can contribute to a comprehensive and 
inclusive understanding of the present stage of the American curriculum field.”129 This 
reflects their collective insight that education is richly complex and requires careful 
and creative reflection. However, this involves open-mindedness to other perspectives. 
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A little later, they write, “We are engaged in an effort to present a detailed portrait of 
the field in which dissenting and disparate voices and traditions, grounded in history, 
can contribute to a more profound understanding of the contemporary curriculum 
field.”130 As such, their now classic curriculum “bible” includes chapters on politics, 
gender and sexuality, theology, aesthetics, autobiography, and a host of other research 
areas—conceptual orientations generally unheard of prior to the reconceptualization.131  
It now appears that many contemporary educational theorists have adopted a similar 
regard for theoretical diversity.  
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CHAPTER IV 
VIRTUE IN CONTEXT 
 
PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
In Chapter II, I presented an overview of regulative virtue epistemology (RVE) 
for the theory and practice of education. I noted that the central concept considered by 
RVE is intellectual virtue. However, the perceptive reader may wonder about the 
concept of intellectual virtue—may wonder if traits like intellectual honesty, courage, 
and charity present a distinctly Western understanding of “good” thinking. This is a 
legitimate concern if RVE is to be endorsed as a viable educational theory. Christopher 
Peterson and Martin E. P. Seligman faced similar worries during the early stages of 
their large-scale empirical and philosophically grounded study of virtue in multiple 
cultural contexts. They too confronted the possibility that virtues are incommensurate 
across cultural lines: 
When we undertook our project, we started by creating our own list. 
With little modesty, we asserted that our list included strengths and 
virtues valued in all contemporary cultures around the world. But when 
we showed our list to colleagues, we encountered the frequent objection 
that there are no strengths and virtues valued across all cultures. Indeed, 
we were told that the subcultural variations along regional, 
socioeconomic, religious, and ethnic lines in just the contemporary 
United States precluded a universal list even for the here and now. We 
took these criticisms seriously and worried about reifying characteristics 
valued only at the turn of the new century by upper-middle-class 
European American academics.132 
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It is fair to assume, I believe, that many scholars in education will express similar 
uncertainties about this project.  
Sharon Todd expresses similar worries about cosmopolitanism—especially its 
idealized vision of humanity. In, Toward an Imperfect Education: Facing Humanity, 
Rethinking Cosmopolitanism, she contends that contemporary cosmopolitanism 
approaches diversity in the language of assimilation rather than exchange. She writes, 
“Exposure to cultures other than our own is put in the service here of make ‘us’ better 
people on ‘our’ own terms.” This language (us and our) derives from a universalized 
concept of humanity—a concept she challenges for its concrete inflexibility. She 
continues, “[This conception of humanity] is evidence of the tendency to incorporate 
diversity, while leaving the main body of reason and moral capacity intact. There is 
not, therefore, much reflection offered on the very possibility of exchange that would 
actually alter the very content of what counts as reason and moral capacity.”133 Instead, 
Todd advocates for “reclaiming” universals through Judith Butler’s notion of “cultural 
translation.”134  
According to Todd, Butler argues that universals are self-negating because the 
very act of abstracting overarching rights or principles eliminates the particular 
persons and cultures to which those rights refer.135 This does not mean a lapse into 
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relativism, however; but a reconceiving of universals as a “struggle for intelligibility.” 
She describes such a universality as one that is “forever dissatisfied with itself, forever 
restless in its search for meaning, and it lives only at the very limits of its own 
articulation.”136 Todd’s book joins an ongoing critical discourse with the Kantian and 
deontological traditions in ethics—one that falls outside the scope of my present 
interest in virtue-based theories.137 Nevertheless, she does articulate an important point 
with respect to how a concept like virtue might be communicated. I will return to this 
in the final section of this chapter. 
This chapter explores the concept of virtue from cultural, religious, and 
philosophical points of view. Of course, each of these perspectives is deeply complex, 
and each appears to inform the other(s). However, this extends well beyond my present 
concerns.138  For the sake of clarity, then, when speaking of the Yoruba and Akan, I am 
largely concerned with cultural practices; my discussion of Confucianism and 
Buddhism draws largely from religious texts, and Greek notions of virtue are derived 
largely from philosophical sources. It is shown that certain ubiquitous virtuous 
character traits are valued across cultural lines, and that similar understandings of 
virtue emerge in almost all cultural and religious contexts. This is demonstrated 
through various religious texts, works of philosophy, and traditional proverbs from 
several very important traditions: Chinese, South Asian, Greek philosophy, and 
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African moral theory. I conclude with a discussion of challenges facing virtue-based 
theories.  
VIRTUE IN CULTURAL CONTEXTS 
According to Smart, three world regions have been particularly influential in 
the history of religion and ideas—China (Taoism and Confucianism), South Asia 
(Buddhism and Hinduism), and the West (Greek philosophy, Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam).139 I follow Smart’s lead, but add African culture because of its historical 
and cultural richness. I survey how virtues are understood and function within several 
of these philosophical and religious traditions. This discussion, while regrettably brief, 
provides sufficient ground for making some general observations. 
Chinese Virtue – Confucianism 
Confucianism was conceived against a backdrop of political turmoil. The Zhou 
Dynasty (1040? – 256 B. C. E.) had recently disintegrated and the king’s authority was 
severely diminished. What power remained was concentrated in the hands of a number 
of dukedoms that imposed their own taxes, raised their own armies, and often waged 
war on each other—and people suffered. Bryan W. Van Norden offers the following 
interesting quote from a leading minister of Jin: 
Our ruler has here 4,000 chariots of war. Even if he acts contrary to the 
Way, it is still necessary to fear him; if he, beyond that, is acting in 
accordance with the Way, who can prove his opponent? An ox may be 
meager; but if it fall upon a pig, would you not fear the pig would die? 
… If we lead on the multitudes of Jin, using also the forces of the other 
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states? … if we come thus to punish Lu for its offenses … what can we 
seek that we shall not get?140 
Although the minister was cognizant of the Way (Dao)—the principles that govern the 
meditative life—other concerns clearly trumped it. In fact, brute reality showed that 
leaders depended more upon force and cunning strategy for prosperity than adherence 
to the Way. This sort of thinking was out of tune with the general regard ordinary 
people had for the Way. These person looked to a distant past when “Heaven” granted 
Kings power and success based on their possession of dé (virtue) and their respect of 
the Way. This bifurcation generated deep social tension.  
It was this chaos into which Confucius was born. The son of a once prosperous 
family, he made the study and teaching of the old traditions his life’s work. Needless 
to say, his teaching took root. Confucianism is undoubtedly the most instrumental 
system of thought to emerge from China. According to Norden, Confucius “provided 
the intellectual background against which all later thinkers react, and he started a 
movement that continues to be socially and philosophically influential more than two 
thousand years later.”141 Confucianism’s influence soon spread out across East Asian 
and eventually spanned continents. However, Confucianism is a misleading term. 
Confucius did not “invent” a brand new religion or system of thought. Rather he 
expanded on a centuries-old Chinese tradition. Xinzhong Yao explains: 
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It is true that as a distinctive ‘school’ Confucianism began with 
Confucius. It was Confucius who explored deeply and elaborated 
extensively on the basic principles of what was to become 
Confucianism, and it was Confucius and his disciples who succeeded in 
transmitting and trans- forming their ancient culture. But it would go too 
far to suggest that Confucianism was ‘created’ solely by Confucius and 
Confucianism was sustained exclusively by the faith in Confucius. In 
this sense, the word ‘Confucianism’ is a misnomer for the tradition that 
is normally referred to as ru jia, ru jiao, ru xue or simply as ru in China 
and other East Asian countries.142 
Nevertheless, Confucius’ role was crucial. By virtue of clearly articulating the central 
tenets of ru, and doing so in a compelling and clear way, Confucius revitalized the 
tradition. What, then, did he have to say? 
 Confucius was primarily concerned with humans and the principles that shaped 
humanity. In particular, he believed that healthy social relationships were essential for 
a prosperous society.143 To this end, he advanced two especially important theses: 
Persons can teach and learn goodness, and a peaceful society is only possible when it 
is ruled by wisdom.144 From these theses, Confucius eventually developed his four key 
ideas—those that would eventually become the foundation for the Confucian tradition. 
First, Confucius continued to promote dao, which literally translates as “path,” “road,” 
or “way.” Following dao was the basis for moral and peaceful social conditions. 
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Second, Confucius promoted rituals (li), which were thought to be instrumental for the 
cultivation of virtue, and a means of educating persons in the ways of ru. Third, he 
stressed the importance of humaneness (ren). Those who practiced ren would 
demonstrate a concern for the wellbeing of others and an avoidance of self-
aggrandizement. And, fourth, Confucius promoted general virtue (dé). Confucian 
virtue was understood as a deeply held moral authority that granted persons power to 
act righteously. Confucius was especially concerned with the cultivation of dé among 
the aristocracy who were ultimately responsible for the prosperity of society.145 Taken 
together these four components roughly describe the tenets of Confucianism. Of 
course, generations of scholars and religious leaders have expanded and transformed 
classical Confucianism. In the following section, I focus largely on primary sources—
the works of Confucius themselves and the five virtues they advance. 
 The central virtue and one of the guiding principles for Confucius is ren. Ren 
functions as a kind of moral attitude and is comprised of various “building block” 
virtues. When these blocks are fitted together a person will display what Confucius 
calls “humanity.” This is compassionate humanity (a concerned regard for the dignity 
of humans) and is central to the Confucius’ social philosophy. The person who 
possesses ren is "a man [sic] who is strong, resolute, simple, and slow to speak is near 
to humanity."146 He seems to suggest that rashness and loquaciousness impede one’s 
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ability to understand the human condition. As noted, however, ren is made up of 
several other virtues (dé). These are described in the analects: 
Zizhang asked about ren. The Master said, “He who can enact five 
things in the world is ren.” When asked for details, he went on, 
“Reverence, tolerance, trustworthiness, quickness, and generosity. He is 
reverent, hence he receives no insults; he is tolerant, hence he gains the 
multitudes; he is trustworthy, hence others entrust him with 
responsibilities; he is quick, hence he has accomplishments; he is 
generous, hence he is capable of being placed in charge of others.147 
These virtues work together and are dependent on each other. One’s generosity should 
be characterized by earnestness; one’s truthfulness prompts diligence, and so forth. 
Confucius never talks about the virtues in isolation. Virtue epistemologists have noted 
this interrelationship between virtues, although the issue is a “thorny” one.148 Finally, 
the moral virtues (dé) culminating in (ren) are expressed via ritual (li).149 In fact, the 
cultivation of virtue is directly tied to ritual and education.  
Cultivation of Virtue 
Confucians believe that virtues are acquired through cultivation and education, 
and/or some mixture of both. “Its chief aim is to educate the learner to be fully human 
and to become a qualified member of the community of trust, and its primary approach 
is to enhance self-cultivation and develop students’ capabilities of fulfilling their 
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responsibilities for themselves, for their families and for society at large.”150 The goal 
of Confucian education (which is true of many cultures) is ultimately tied to the social 
prosperity of the community. Confucius writes, “Cultivate yourself to bring comfort to 
the people.”151 Learning begins with oneself but extends to others. Confucius takes this 
one step forward, arguing that a love of learning is requisite for many of the virtues. 
If, you love ren, but you do not love learning, the flaw is ignorance. If 
you love knowledge but you do not love learning, the flaw is unruliness. 
If you love faithfulness but do not love learning, the flaw is harming 
others. If you love straightforwardness but you do not love learning, the 
flaw is offensiveness. If you love valor but you do not love learning, the 
flaw is causing chaos. If you love incorruptibility but you do not love 
learning, the flaw is recklessness.152  
The desire to learn—that is, to take an active hand in acquiring new understanding—
plays an important role for Confucius. Students who train their minds have the tools 
available to achieve positive ethical outcomes; they have the necessary know-how and 
know-that to exercise virtue. Moreover, learning itself refines and strengthens these 
virtues. Without learning, however, the impulse to behave virtuously may never obtain 
or (worse still) may result in vicious behavior. There is another important point to be 
made: “love of knowledge” is also an intellectual virtue—one that plays a very 
important role in the acquisition of knowledge and understanding. Roberts and Wood, 
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for example, argue that the love of knowledge is a central epistemic virtue. Those who 
love knowledge are prone toward fact checking, persistence, and open-mindedness. In 
short, those who love learning also love knowledge.153 
 Finally, I wish to note a few important features of traditional Confucian 
education—features that putatively nurture the aforementioned virtues. Educators in 
the Confucian tradition stress deep reflection, which involves intense study and careful 
analysis of the subject matter. The ultimate goal of this educational activity—at least 
on the traditional account—is the perfection of the person. Quite contrary to the 
Christian view of “original sin” and essential wickedness of human nature, Confucius 
held that persons were fundamentally good. Education, then, provided a way to move 
toward this perfection. Chinese students have amassed a well-deserved (almost stereo 
typical) reputation for being extremely diligent and hardworking. This might be 
attributable to the philosophical (and educational) foundation laid by Confucius and his 
followers. The very first lines of the Analects illustrate how important study was to 
Confucius: “The Master said: To study and at due times practice what one has studied, 
is this not a pleasure?” For Confucians, education is a lifelong process of self-
cultivation that emphasizes strength of will and determination. Timothy Bergen 
explains that Chinese emphases on “perfectibility, learning, rationality, effort, and 
will-power” are closely related to one another in Confucian literature, and that “this 
fact sheds light upon how Eastern learners view education and explains why effort is 
                                                
153. Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 153-182 
 89 
seen as important in the process of human perfectibility.”154 In the language of virtue: 
Chinese educational culture values diligence and steadfastness with respect to learning. 
South Asian Virtue – Buddhism 
Buddhism is among the largest and most influential religions in the world. Its 
primary concentration is in the region of South Asia, which includes India, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Burma. Leslie Alldritt estimates that there 
are approximately 360 million Buddhists in the world, making it the third largest 
religion in the world after Christianity and Islam.155 It has been estimated that over half 
of the world’s population lives in areas significantly influenced by Buddhism.156 
Numerous varieties of Buddhism exist, although three broad schools are dominate: the 
Southern variety where Theravada Buddhism is prevalent, the Eastern version which 
mixes Chinese religious tradition with Buddhism, and the Northern variety found in 
Tibetan culture—the modern inheritors of ancient Indian Buddhism.157 The following 
analysis draws from the sacred canons of each of these schools with the intention of 
providing a general account of Buddhist understandings of virtue. 
 The founder of Buddhism, Siddhārtha Gautama (500? – 350? B.C.E.) was born 
and taught near the Ganges River in Northeastern India. However, the historical facts 
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about his life remain contested. Most accounts, though, assert that he was born into a 
wealthy family and with the prospect of hold power. Michael Carrithers offers the 
following sketch: 
The Buddha was born the son of a king, and so grew up with wealth, 
pleasure and the prospect of power, all goods commonly desired by 
human beings. As he reached manhood, however, he was confronted 
with a sick man, an old man and a corpse. He had lived a sheltered life, 
and these affected him profoundly, for he realized that no wealth or 
power could prevent him too from experiencing illness, old age and 
death. He also saw a wandering ascetic, bent on escaping these 
sufferings. Reflecting on what he had seen, he reached the first great 
turning-point of his life: against the wishes of his family he renounced 
home, wife, child and position to become a homeless wanderer, seeking 
release from this apparently inevitable pain.158 
Despite Carrithers own admission that his account is only roughly true, it nevertheless 
explains an important feature of the Buddhist religion. The Buddha’s path to 
enlightenment originated in his confrontation with the existence of pain and suffering. 
Carrithers goes on to describe how the Buddha began his spiritual journey by 
practicing meditation and self-mortification. These proved ineffective until one day he 
determined to quietly reflect upon the human plight. From this tranquil contemplation 
he achieved an awakening—solving the “enigma” of suffering. For the next forty-five 
years he spread his message of enlightenment, and a world religion was born.159 
 To grasp how Buddhists understand the concept virtue, it is necessary to cover 
the basic teaching of Buddhism. According to Stephen Laumakis, the most important 
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concept in all Buddhist thought is the notion that who we are is product of our 
thinking. Just as the body is shaped by food and exercise (or lack thereof), so too can 
we “maintain, shape, transform, and indeed, strengthen” our minds’ “powers by 
meditative practices and exercises.”160 To control the mind and thus perception is the 
goal of Buddhist religious experience. Bearing this insight in mind, let us briefly 
consider the tenets and practices of Buddhism as manifest in the Middle Way, Four 
Noble Truths, and Eightfold Path.  
The Three Teachings 
The Buddha taught that a way between extreme asceticism and hedonism 
existed—what came to be known as the Middle Way. The Buddha discovered that self-
denial and mortification produced debilitating emotional and physical suffering, and 
failed to live up to its promises. While, on the other hand, hedonistic enjoyment of 
life’s pleasures failed to fulfill his desire for peace, worldly pleasure was too fleeting 
to bring lasting joy. The Middle Way, however, “gives rise to vision, which gives rise 
to knowledge, which leads to peace, to direct knowledge, to enlightenment…”161 
Metaphysically, the implications of the Middle Way are that human souls are not fixed 
and eternal, nor are they destined for ultimate annihilation. Instead, they are annatta—
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lacking a fixed self.162 Epistemologically, the Middle Way suggests cautious path 
between naïve certainty and total skepticism about our beliefs.  
The Four Noble Truths capture the basic teachings of the Buddha and are 
modeled on Indian medical science: confirming that patient is sick, diagnosing the 
sickness, prescribing treatment, and implementing the cure. The Truths follow this 
pattern. The first noble truth simply states that dukkha (suffering and pain) exists—
both existential and physical dukkha. This is the starting point of the Buddha’s 
thought. The second Noble Truth is more complex. It states that the causes of dukkha 
are linked in a causal chain that begins with “contact” with the world, others, and 
ourselves. This contact produces sensation, which in turn producing craving, and 
craving produces suffering when it is unrequited. The third Noble truth states that the 
cessation of these causes of dukkha is possible. Finally, the fourth Noble Truth 
prescribes the Way to overcome dukkha—the Eightfold Path.163 
The specifics of the Buddha’s Middle Way are laid out in the Eightfold path. 
These steps are:164 
Right View or Understanding 
Right Thought or Purpose 
Right Speech 
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Right Behavior 
Right Livelihood 
Right Effort 
Right Mindfulness 
Right Concentration 
The term “path” suggests that one takes consecutive and linear steps toward 
enlightenment. This is a misunderstanding as these steps occur simultaneously. 
Moreover, the word “right” indicates that one correctly perceives the true state of 
affairs or reality. These steps are also divisible into three main categories: Wisdom, 
Meditation, and Moral Action. The first category—Wisdom—indicates that one grasps 
the Four Noble Truths and their implications for life. “This is the greatest wisdom that 
one can achieve in this life. These are skillful, useful, and beneficial views. If you 
attain this wisdom, you are liberated from the cycle of pain and sorrow.”165 Grasping 
this Wisdom recommends one take steps toward addressing the existence of dukkha. 
Meditation, the second category, explicates this massive mental struggle to free the 
mind of evil states. Controlling the mind and cultivating strength of will are essential 
because the mind defaults to craving and grasping for things that lead to suffering. The 
final category—Moral Action—involves our conduct in speech, behavior, and 
livelihood. Here Buddhists believe that the reduction of dukkha depends upon our 
willingness resist participating in the causal chain of suffering. Put differently, when 
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we resist repaying an evil with another evil we stop the chain reaction that promulgates 
further suffering. This final category gets us closer to a Buddhist theory of virtue. 
Buddhism and Virtue 
Three steps on the Eightfold Path deal explicitly with moral action. It is not 
surprising that Buddhists have written extensively on moral character. According to 
Damien Keown, “There is more to the Buddhist moral life than following rules. Rules 
must not only be followed, but followed for the right reasons and with the correct 
motivation. It is here that the role of the virtues becomes important.” He goes on to 
claim that the precepts (rules) and virtues are two sides of the same coin. Precepts are 
essentially “a list of things a virtuous person would never do.”166 Like many other 
religious traditions, Buddhist virtues are supposed to be habituated so that they come 
forth naturally from a person’s character. This corresponds with Zagzebski’s 
observations about the motivational component of intellectual and moral virtues—the 
view that they impel us to act and think in particular ways.167 Likewise, the virtues 
counteract their dukkha producing opposites—klesas (what we call vices in the West). 
In other words, those who are virtuous are less prone toward generating more suffering 
in the world.  
Perhaps the most influential list of virtues was composed in the Mahayana 
tradition. In this tradition, the bodhisattva (an enlightened person or being) practices 
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six core virtues—referred to as the paramita or Six Perfections. These include 
generosity, morality, patience, perseverance, meditation, and insight.168 However, 
earlier it was noted that followers of the Buddha must struggle to avoid negative 
thinking. This fact directly affects the way that such virtues are practiced. Suppose an 
enlightened Buddhist monk decides to minister to the needs of homeless people. He 
discovers an alley where the homeless are living in cardboard boxes. They are dirty, 
underfed, and sickly. A natural human response would to be to place oneself in these 
persons shoes, and to be filled with despair.  
To become emotionally identified with her would be like a person 
without any ability to swim jumping into a lake to save a drowning 
child, which would result in a double drowning. It is necessary for a 
compassionate person to be cool-headed and emotionally self-
controlled, a posture similar to that of a medical doctor analyzing a 
patient and prescribing a remedy in a detached manner—which does not 
mean a cold-hearted, uncaring way. The Buddhist goal is to strive for 
the spontaneous exercise of compassion.169 
Thus the monk has learned to control his mind. He understands (insight) the situation 
and feels appropriate amounts of compassion and generosity. He also understands that 
his ministrations—while good and noble—will make only a small difference. And he 
perseveres; he returns to that ally each day, all the while refusing to succumb to 
dukkha.  
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 Virtue is taught via the Five Precepts that lay Buddhists are encouraged to 
follow in both the Mahayana and Theravada traditions. These include a respect for life, 
avoidance of theft, abstinence from sexual misconduct, avoidance of untruthfulness, 
and avoidance of drunkenness. The precepts “are meant to be followed by Buddhists at 
all times, the object being to establish a habit-formation of virtuous and restrained 
conduct, in opposition to the unwholesome tendencies of greed, hatred, and 
delusion….”170 Living by these principles not only encourages self-control and moral 
behavior, but also places a person in a positive—habit forming—state of mind that 
affects deep change. Helmut Klar offers several methods for inculcating the Five 
Precepts into a child’s education. First, he notes that imitation (of parents and teachers) 
is of central importance. When parents take their dharmic responsibilities seriously, 
and live those convictions out, children will imitate them. Klar also encourages parents 
to celebrate Buddhism with their children. This can be done by keeping images of the 
Buddha in the home, and celebrating festival days. Finally, he notes the importance of 
reading and discussing Buddhist texts with children, especially the Five Precepts.171 
Taken together, such activities are foundations for “learning by heart”—that is, 
fostering a deep regard and love of Buddhism from a very early age.  
Cultivation of virtue is integral to following the Middle Way of the Buddha, 
and thus assumes privileged place in Buddhist monastic education. Future monks are 
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taught the necessity of cultivating inward virtues in both ritual-based education and 
their philosophical training. George B. J. Dryfuss, a Westerner who studied in the 
Dalai Lama’s temple for 15 years, describes several ways this is done. First, he points 
out that newly arrived monks are immersed in rigorous ritual life. New monks, for 
example, are encouraged to recite texts with specific and highly precise inflection.172 
This is thought to preserve textual meaning, but it is also thought to cultivate the 
virtues of conscientiousness and carefulness.173 If monks decide to pursue scholarship 
in the monastery, their training regimen intensifies significantly. They continue to 
memorize large portions of text (largely philosophical texts) but add to this education 
training in debate—the primary method of teaching for many monastic teachers. The 
central goal of which is to produce perspicuity of thought and critical reasoning skills. 
As noted earlier, however, the skills (or virtues) do not operate in isolation from other 
virtues. The monk, whose thoughts penetrate truth, is one whose character is deeply 
virtuous.174  
Greek Philosophy 
Virtue has a long history in Western (European) thought—particularly through 
the influence of Greek philosophy and Christianity—and one could fill several 
volumes tracing its extensive influence. Instead, I provide a very rough sketch of virtue 
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by highlighting some key concepts that emerge from Greek philosophy and 
contemporary virtue ethics. It should also be noted that the RVE advocated in Chapter 
II traces its intellectual genealogy to Aristotle—a fact that will be clear in the 
following paragraphs.  
The two key concepts that preoccupied ancient Greek moral theory were virtue 
(arête) and happiness (eudaimonia). Prior to Plato and Aristotle, however, the two 
concepts were nearly synonymous. “[Virtue] amounts, roughly, to success in life, 
where such success is measured largely if not entirely in external terms—in the extent 
to which one has acquired the typically recognized good things in life: wealth, power, 
friends, and the like.”175 The distinction between virtue and happiness on this account 
is blurry. Virtue is understood almost exclusively by its external manifestation, e.g., 
one is virtuous when one is obviously successful. In Plato and Aristotle, however, 
virtue is redefined as an internal characteristic or trait.176 One might act courageously, 
for example, but one is courageous only insofar as courage is a deeply engrained 
character trait.  
Aristotle is probably the most influential Greek philosopher to articulate a 
concept of virtue. He begins by noting that our actions generally have a goal (telos)—a 
reason for having done them. “Every skill and every inquiry, and similarly every action 
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and rational choice, is thought to aim at some good.”177 Indeed, if our actions lacked 
some sort of goal they would be essentially meaningless. Aristotle also distinguishes 
between to forms of tele: there are goals that facilitate achieving other goals, and there 
are goals that we pursue for their own sake. Consider the act of making cookies. There 
are a whole series of steps I must take in order to make (and eat) a batch of cookies. I 
have to run to the market and purchase the ingredients, prepare the batter, kneed the 
dough, pre-heat the oven, and so forth. Each of these steps is a telos—but each points 
toward a greater telos: to enjoy a batch of fresh cookies. This greater telos—enjoying 
cookies—explains the steps I took along the way. “The ubiquitous human phenomenon 
of doing things for reasons, therefore, depends on there being at least one thing we 
pursue for its own sake.”178 Of course, there are many things we pursue for their own 
sake—friends, lovers, children, prosperity, pleasure, and so on. But, as Aristotle notes, 
“we choose them also for the sake of happiness, on the assumption that through them 
we shall live a life of happiness; whereas happiness no one chooses for the sake of any 
of these nor indeed for the sake of anything else.”179 In short, for Aristotle happiness is 
the ultimate good and the telos for which we should all strive. 
What role do virtues like courage, honesty, and practical wisdom play in the 
acquisition of happiness? To address this question, two points need to be clarified. 
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First, Aristotle tells us that our basic function—that which makes us distinctly 
human—is our capacity to reason. Roger Crisp offers an interesting and helpful 
analogy. “It is worth remembering that in Greek a horse that ran fast could be said to 
have a ‘virtue’ or excellence, in so far as it performed well its characteristic 
activity.”180 A horse has a virtue when it performs well in one of its basic functions. 
Many take Aristotle to be endorsing what has come to be known as the “function 
argument, which takes the following form:181  
1. Happiness is “doing well.”  
2. Doing well means performing our human function well. 
3. Our human function is reasoning. 
4. Therefore, happiness consists in using our reason well. 
5. Therefore, happiness is activity of excellence of reason. 
When persons reason well—the basic function—they do so because they exercise 
virtue. Nafsika Athanassoulis elaborates: “If the function of man [sic] is reason, then 
the good man is the man who reasons well. This is the life of excellence or of 
eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is the life of virtue—activity in accordance with reason, 
man’s highest function.”182 Thus happiness is the byproduct of reasoning well—of 
virtuous reasoning. This leads to a second consideration. 
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Second, the nature of reason is tied to Aristotle’s understanding of the bipartite 
soul. Briefly, the soul is divisible into rational and non-rational parts.183 The rational 
segment is the source of the intellectual virtues—the chief of which is practical 
wisdom. It is less obvious how the non-rational part of the soul relates to reason. Once 
more a division is created—this time into a part concerned with things like nutrition, 
but also a part that has “more in common with reason, and is capable both of opposing 
it (in the case of a weak- willed person, for instance) and of obeying it. The virtues of 
this second sub-part are the virtues of character: courage, generosity, and so on.”184 
Thus, excellent (virtuous) reasoning is tied to both virtues of character and intellectual 
virtues. As a consequence, those who are morally and intellectually virtuous 
experience eudaimonia. 
 How, then, are the (moral and intellectual) virtues acquired? In the first place, 
Aristotle thinks they are acquired through different and separate means: “intellectual 
virtue owes its origin and development mainly to teaching, for which reason its 
attainment requires experience and time; virtue of character (ēthos) is a result of 
habituation (ethos), for which reason it has acquired its name through a small variation 
on ‘ethos.’”185 Thus Aristotle’s virtues are acquired in two ways—through teaching 
(intellectual virtues) and habituation (moral virtues). Let us consider intellectual 
virtues first.  
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Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of intellectual virtue: the 
contemplative and the calculative. According to Dunne, contemplative virtues are 
learned deductively—that is, one starts with the general and moves toward the 
specific.186 These virtues include episteme (scientific knowledge), nous (intuitive 
reason), and Sophia (philosophical wisdom). Episteme or “scientific knowledge” 
provides a good example. One can (putatively) only acquire this virtue deductively—
that is, by listening to descriptions, considering explanations, and studying the 
arguments of one’s instructors. The upshot is that it is acquired through teaching, not 
habituation. The calculative virtues, on the other hand, are more difficult to restrict to 
the result of teaching alone. In brief, the calculative virtues include phronesis (practical 
wisdom) and techne (skill). These virtues “enable one to attain ‘variable’ (contingent) 
truths that are ‘in agreement with right desire.’”187 Moreover, each is acquire via 
inductive and deductive teaching. Practical wisdom, for example, is obtained through 
listening and considering lectures about “what is noble and just.”188 Thus one learns 
practical wisdom via deduction. But induction is also important. This entails learning 
through practice—e.g., practice adjudicating and considering particulars—which 
begins to look very similar to habituation. I consider this point in more depth in the 
following chapter. 
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The moral virtues, as noted above, are acquired through habituation. “We 
become builders by building, and lyre-players by playing the lyre. So too we become 
just by doing just actions, temperate by temperate actions, and courageous by 
courageous actions.”189 In short, we become virtuous by practicing virtue, which has 
the clear implication that the moral upbringing of students cannot be taught by 
instruction alone. It requires that children consistently practice virtuous acts thereby 
acquiring truly virtuous character traits. The matter is complicated, however, by 
Aristotle’s claim that one cannot become truly morally virtuous without the presence 
of the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom.  
It is clear from what we have said, then, that we cannot be really good 
without practical wisdom, or practically wise without virtue of 
character. Moreover, on these lines one might also meet the dialectical 
argument that could be used to suggest that the virtues exist in isolation 
from one another. The same person, it might be argued, is not best 
suited by nature for all the virtues, so that he will already have acquired 
one before he has acquired another. This is possible in respect of the 
natural virtues, but not in respect of those on the basis of which a person 
is said to be really good; for he will possess all of them as soon as he 
acquires the one, practical wisdom.190 
This is because the complexities of life often demand we discern a how to act properly. 
This interdependence of intellectual and moral virtues is at the heart of Aristotle’s 
argument for the unity of the virtues.  
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African Concepts of Virtue 
There is a vibrant philosophical community on the African continent. For 
example, in A Companion to African Philosophy, Kwasi Wiredu assembles an 
impressively diverse collection of essays addressing topics like the philosophy of 
mind, history of African philosophy, logic, and moral philosophy—all from a 
distinctly African perspective. But what is African philosophy? Somewhat simplified, 
there are presently two general perspectives on African philosophy—the traditional 
and the anti-ethnophilosophical. According to Wiredu, “Traditionalists have 
tended…to restrict the concerns of modern African philosophy to issues having some 
connection with traditional African thought and culture.” On the other hand, the anti-
ethnophilosophers argue that “the modern world presents intellectual challenges which 
may not all admit of such a derivation, and to abstain from involvement with them on 
the grounds of a non-African origination is unlikely to prove a blessing to Africa in the 
modern world.”191 The division, then, centers on the role of Western thought. This 
issue extends beyond the concerns of this chapter. I would note, however, that the 
notion of virtue advanced here draws from traditional African philosophy.  
It is also worth noting that the term “African Philosophy” is equivalent to using 
the term “Western philosophy;” each encompasses innumerable philosophical 
perspectives colored by a larger cultural milieu. Sensitive to this, I have tried to restrict 
my generalizations to those made by Africans doing philosophy. There is good reason 
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for this. Africa is in the midst of crisis of self-identity—the consequence of having 
been aggressively colonized for centuries. It is for those whose lives are tied to the 
African continent, whose futures are (literally) at stake, to generalize about the nature 
of that self-identity.  
Foundations for Moral Thought in Africa 
In most African cultures, the foundation of ethics is twofold: a respect for the 
individual appropriately balanced with the needs of the community. But this is a 
tenuous balance as Segun Gbadegesin notes: 
From this it follows that there need not be any tension between 
individuality and community since it is possible for an individual to 
freely give up his/her own perceived interest for the survival of the 
community. But in giving up one’s interests thus, one is also sure that 
the community will not disown one and that one’s well being will be its 
concern…. The idea of individual rights, based on a conception of 
individuals as atoms, is therefore bound to be foreign to this system. For 
community is founded on notions of an intrinsic and enduring 
relationship among its members. 192  
To understand the virtues, one first needs to grasp the interdependent relationship 
between the individual and the community, and the mutual demands engendered by 
this relationship. Gbadegesin uses the term “survival” quite deliberately; many African 
communities have extremely limited access to natural resources. The individual that 
fails to grasp her obligations to community risk expulsion. What, then, is the character 
of this bond between the person and her community? Traditionally, this connection has 
been understood as fundamentally rooted in religion—that is, that the basis for 
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morality is inextricably tied to the deeply religious nature of African culture. Several 
notable African scholars have propagated this view, including Bolaji Idowu, John 
Mbiti, and J. O. Awolala. Unfortunately, this view also misses an important point: 
“These authors fail to understand what makes religion important in African life, 
namely, the welfare of the individual and that of society.”193 African people are not—
in the pejorative sense—so deeply religious as to have no regard for human welfare 
outside of religious systems of thought. Indeed, religion serves as a means of 
discharging their responsibilities to maintain human welfare. Devotion and worship of 
deities is performed genuinely, but not for the sake of the deity. Rather religious 
worship is offered for the benefit of society. When a deity fails to serve (or bless) the 
interests of the society, people are free to sever that relationship.194 In short, African 
people value human life for its own sake—not as the product of blind religiosity.  
African Virtue 
Bearing these contextualizing remarks in mind, we can now turn our attention 
to African notions of virtue. Kwame Gyekye notes, “Good character is the essence of 
the African moral system, the linchpin of the moral wheel.” 195 Indeed, he goes on to 
claim, “Many writers have made the observation that despite the indisputable cultural 
diversity that arises from Africa's ethnic pluralism, there are underlying affinities in 
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many areas of the African life; this is surely true in the African religious and moral 
outlook. There are some features of the moral life and thought of various African 
societies that…are common or shared features.” Following Gyekye’s assertion that 
“good character” is the basis for moral reasoning in African society, I examine the two 
largest ethnic populations in Western Africa—the Yoruba and Akan people.  
Bewaji notes that the Yoruba hold to a set of pervasive ethical norms that 
regulate the behavior of both persons and the gods. Those who live uprightly—whose 
character exhibit virtue with respect to themselves, tribal elders, and others in general 
are variously called oniwa rere, oniwa tutu, and Omoluwabi.196 These terms denote 
persons that are esteemed in their respective societies for their virtuous character. 
Bolatito Lanre-Abass highlights six core virtues in Yoruba society. These include 
integrity (iwa), justice (iwa eto), trust (igbagbo), accountability (akoyawo), sensitivity 
(iyara ni imo), and service (ise iranse). 197 The importance of cultivating such virtues is 
caught up in the Yoruba proverb, “The adornment of a smile is white teeth; the 
adornment of a person is good character.”198 Such proverbs are illustrative: they 
succinctly encapsulate the rooted cultural wisdom about the importance of virtue. As 
noted above, Africa societies emphasize the individual’s responsibility to the 
community and vice versa; the Yoruba are no different. The good or virtuous 
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community member values and speaks highly of her town. “Whoever says the town is 
not pleasant should pack his or her luggage and head for the bush.”199 Indeed, 
numerous proverbs recommend that loyal community members should be recognized 
and rewarded for their faithfulness to community.  
The Akan people of Western Africa echo similar sentiments. “When virtue 
founds a town, the town thrives and abides.” The Akan link the success of a town to its 
character—or rather, the character of its people. This reiterates the social nature of 
African moral thought and central place of character. Indeed, individual happiness is 
only achieved when one is in right standing with his fellows: “The well-being of man 
depends on his fellow man.”200 Among the several virtues valued by the Akan are 
goodwill, sympathy, compassion, and altruism. But this raises another question: How 
are the virtues acquired or learned?  
Personhood and the Acquisition of Virtuous Character 
Becoming virtuous is an ongoing process social education in which persons 
continually evolve. In fact, the relationship between character and education is the 
basis for understanding personhood in African thought. Ifeanyi Menkiti explains: 
The various societies found in traditional Africa routinely accept this 
fact that personhood is the sort of thing which has to be attained, and is 
attained in direct proportion as one participates in communal life 
through the discharge of the various obligations defined by one's 
stations. It is the carrying out of these obligations that transforms one 
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from the it-status of early child-hood, marked by an absence of moral 
function, into the person-status of later years, marked by a widened 
maturity of ethical sense—an ethical maturity without which 
personhood is conceived as eluding one.201  
According to Menkiti we begin our life-journey with it-status—that is, without a 
secure identity. Over time, however, through responsible participation in the life of the 
community we obtain person-status. D. A. Masolo argues that personhood is actually 
“attained through an educational process that intensifies at every stage in one’s growth 
and development.”202 He offers the example of message carrying. Children in many 
African communities are tasked with carrying message from one person to another. 
While seemingly innocuous, such task are designed to train children “in the virtue of 
obedience and serve to others while also bring them to the knowledge of close and 
distant relatives, an obvious attempt to fit children into the larger social system…”203 
As children mature into adolescence and then to adulthood, their social obligations 
increase (as does their status as persons). Ideally, their character develops in similar 
proportion. Of course, both good and bad character traits may emerge. One Akan 
proverb states that “one is not born with a bad head, but one takes it on from the 
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earth.”204 In short, persons are not born with intrinsic character traits and habits, but 
obtain them through time, training, and experience.  
POINTS OF CONTACT AND DIVERGENCE 
 It goes without saying that the intellectual traditions discussed are radically 
different in many ways: their religions, cultural traditions, even their moral practices 
and laws. Certain Asian cultures, for example, believe it is perfectly ordinary and 
unproblematic to give monetary gifts to potential clients in order to gain their business. 
In the United States such practices are illegal. Likewise, the sacrifice of animals is an 
act of worship for many cultures, but a cause for horror in many European cultures. 
This highlights the fact that, although two cultures may value similar virtues, the 
manner in which these virtues shape customs and practices leaves a lot of room for 
difference.  
The Confucian notion of Ren—the sum total of virtues leading to compassion—
is a crucial component of Confucian ethics. Both Buddhist and African traditions also 
have place great emphasis on an empathetic stance toward others. Indeed, the stability 
of African communities hinges on a concern for the wellbeing of other members of the 
community. Although Aristotle was primarily concerned with individual happiness, he 
also believed that those who were virtuous would display attitudes of friendliness, 
generosity, and justice.  
Buddhism’s emphasis on enlightenment is founded on controlling and 
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modifying one’s cognitive life. A similar thrust is evident in Confucianism’s emphasis 
on the importance of education. Recall that Confucius believed a love of knowledge 
central to the acquisition of virtue. In fact, he believed that one would become vicious 
without knowledge.205 This partially explains why both traditions emphasize diligence 
and hard work with respect to learning. Aristotle also stressed the importance of the 
cognitive life, believing that our most basic function is reason. Those who reason well 
embody the virtues. They also experience happiness and Aristotle tells us “happiness, 
therefore, will be some form of contemplation.”206  
With respect to the virtues of character, Aristotle argued that they are obtained 
through habituation and practice. This insight is echoed in African moral thought. 
Children are given multi-layered tasks that develop character, and initiate them into to 
the larger community. The latter is intended to cultivate a concern for the wellbeing of 
the community at large. This is a form of habituation, or learning by practice and 
repetition, and a feature that African societies share with the other traditions discussed. 
The rigorous memory training undergone by Buddhist monks, for example, teaches 
diligence, conscientiousness and carefulness (recall, they must inflect perfectly). 
Furthermore, Confucians, Buddhists, and Aristotelians share a regard for rules and/or 
precepts. These do not replace the cultivation of virtue. Rather, they provide a 
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framework that enables persons to mature into virtue.  
A devotion to community is a central feature of many African societies. Indeed, 
one’s personhood hinges on maturing into a responsible (virtuous) adult. For the Yoruba 
this involves cultivating integrity, justice, trustworthiness, accountability, sensitivity, and 
service. These community-directed virtues are echoed in each of the traditions 
considered. This is evident in Confucian idea of ren—of becoming “near to 
humanity.”207 The person who has ren has a deep concern for other members of the 
community. Buddhists also practice community-directed virtues. For example, the 
custom of giving is an ancient practice intended bring the negative craving for personal 
possessions under control, but it is also practiced for the sake of the wellbeing and unity 
of the community.208 Finally, in a passage on the virtue of friendship, Aristotle states 
clearly that a concern for community is tied a person’s honor: “The person who 
contributes nothing to the community is not honored, since what is common is given to 
the person who benefits the community, and honor is something common.”209 
Clearly positive accounts of virtue a present in each of the traditions 
considered. In this respect, the concept of virtue putatively transcends cultural 
“borders” and religious traditions. But this does not diminish the fact that cultures also 
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differ in terms of the virtues. Martin and Seligman conducted a survey of 15,000 
persons from numerous distinct cultural contexts, and undertook a large-scale 
historical survey of ancient traditions to determine how virtues function in multiple 
contexts. They found that, despite these variations, six core virtues were present in 
every cultural context.  
When data collection was complete, analysis involved condensing each 
list by locating thematically similar virtues and classifying them under 
an obviously emerging core virtue. By that term, we mean an abstract 
ideal encompassing a number of other, more specific virtues that 
reliably converge to the recognizable higher-order category.210  
These higher-order categories included: wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, 
temperance, and transcendence. Twenty-four additional and more specific virtues were 
then categorized under each of these headings. Here there was a greater degree of 
variety between cultures. It is also important to note that these higher-order virtues did 
not share a one-to-one relationship across cultures. Martin and Seligman explain: 
Furthermore, to say that certain virtues—across traditions—converge 
onto a core virtue likewise does not mean that we argue for a one-to-one 
mapping of a virtue across cultures. Certainly an abstraction such as 
justice will mean slightly different things—and will be valued for 
different reasons—from one culture to another. Again what we suggest 
is coherent resemblance: The higher order meaning behind a particular 
core virtue will line up better with its cross-cultural counterpart than it 
will with any other core virtue.211  
Thus the core virtues are not universal in the sense that they are understood exactly the 
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same or are appreciated for the same reasons. Rather, they bear a family resemblance 
to on another and function in generally the same way across cultures. In sum, persons 
from different cultures value the same general character traits. Even if greater 
emphasis is placed on a particular virtue in one culture, it does not stand to reason that 
this nullifies virtue as a useful concept. It simply means that more work needs to be 
done to improve cross-cultural understanding.  
This brings us back to Sharon Todd’s observations about the “struggle for 
intelligibility.” Recall, she argues that the concept of humanity, as articulated in most 
accounts of cosmopolitanism, is one-side and eliminates the possibility of mutual 
“exchange.”212 As such, those whose experiences do not match the majority are 
marginalized and effectively silenced. I believe that virtue—or more precisely—
virtuous communication might aid in ameliorating this issue. David Carr has pointed 
out that the strength of virtue ethics (and VE) is that the language it employs cuts 
across cultural divides: 
To be sure, we can see that people from different parts of the world have 
very different—even contradictorily opposed—moral beliefs, but we are 
nevertheless able to recognize certain cross-cultural criteria of moral 
attitude and conduct. The Moslem [sic] shopkeeper down the road has 
different beliefs from me, but I am well able to appreciate his honesty, 
integrity, courage and industry; on the other hand, I may have no trouble 
recognizing the racist bigots who persecute him—albeit in the name of 
my own culture—for the liars and cowards that they are. It is also 
clearly important that some such cross-cultural criteria of moral value 
are recognizable if there is to be the possibility of holding some cultures 
to moral account precisely for their injustice, mendacity, 
intemperateness or cruelty. From this viewpoint, it seems a mistake to 
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index virtues to rival moral traditions in the manner of some recent neo-
idealist moral and social theories—for the language of virtue is arguably 
the cross-cultural ethical currency of humankind.213 
The evidence presented thus far suggests that Carr is correct; talk of courage, honesty, 
and justice are not foreign concepts to those of diverse backgrounds. Carr does not 
mention, however, that the cross-cultural “language of virtue” is predicated on a 
disposition and willingness to communicate. Likewise, Todd’s “struggle for 
intelligibility” depends upon an inclination and willing to strive for deeper cultural 
exchanges. I suggest, then, that certain character traits are crucial if cultural exchange 
and understanding is to be achieved. An individual and society should be open-minded 
and epistemically humble. An open-minded person or society is receptive to other 
ideas and customs; it values and thus strives to understand others. It is also a person or 
society that displays epistemic humility—an acknowledgement that what we know and 
understand about other people groups is potentially wrong-headed, limited, or 
misguided. It does not arrogantly cling to its own final and fixed understanding of 
others. When Todd speaks of a society “forever dissatisfied with itself, forever restless 
in its search for meaning…” she is, I contend, speaking of an open-minded and 
epistemically humble society.214  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF VIRTUE 
EPISTEMOLOGY TO THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EDUCATION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In Chapter II, I advanced a “wide” regulative virtue epistemology (RVE)—the 
view that the intellectual virtues are of central importance in the acquisition of a broad 
array of epistemic goods: knowledge, understanding, and acquaintance among them. In 
the following chapter, I considered how knowledge has been understood in educational 
theory. I demonstrated that education is rife with diverse theories of knowledge, and 
that many of these are at least partially compatible with a virtue perspective. I then 
considered the concept of virtue itself, how it functions in multiple cultural contexts. 
The intention here was to allay important worries about the applicability of virtue in 
diverse educational settings and to illustrate that virtue provides a cross-cultural 
language. 
Herein, I argue that an RVE provides important insight into the theory and 
practice of education. To this end, I focus on a fundamental issue in education: the 
epistemic purposes of education. I maintain that the present knowledge and skill 
focused approach in education is overly narrow. Jonathan Kvanvig makes similar 
remarks about the discipline of epistemology, 
Epistemology is often taken to be the theory of knowledge, but that 
conception is too narrow. At the most general level of characterization, 
epistemology is the study of certain aspects of our cognitive endeavors. 
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In particular, it aims to investigate successful cognition. Within its 
purview, then, are various kinds of cognizing, including processes such 
as thinking, inquiring, and reasoning; events such as changes in one’s 
world view or the adoption of a different perspective on things; and 
states such as beliefs, assumptions, presuppositions, tents, working 
hypotheses and the like. Also within its purview is the variety of 
cognitive successes, including true beliefs and opinions, viewpoints that 
make sense of the course of experience, tents that are empirically 
adequate, knowledge, understanding, theoretical wisdom, rational 
presuppositions, justified assumptions, working hypotheses likely to be 
true, responsible inquiry, and the like.215 
The cognitive successes Kvanvig describes are epistemic goals; they are states that 
persons strive to obtain. As such, they are sometimes called epistemic goods. In what 
follows, I introduce two additional epistemic goals of education that are worthy of 
consideration—acquaintance and understanding. These were selected because of their 
importance for education.216 Moreover, I suggest that understanding ought to stand as 
chief among these because it provides a more inclusive and comprehensive account of 
the aims of cognizing—one that entails these other epistemic goods.  
I consider this matter in light of recent work on value in epistemology. This 
discourse on value focuses (in part) on answering the following question: Why is 
knowledge more valuable than true belief? I suggest that a slight alteration to this 
question suggests new ways of thinking about epistemology and education. This 
discussion aims to show how understanding—the chief epistemic good—entails other 
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epistemic goods and is shaped by the intellectual virtues. I then consider how RVE 
handles the social dimensions of education through consideration of communication. I 
maintain that virtuous communication is critical for the development of understanding. 
And, finally, I consider two proposals for teaching intellectual virtue, highlighting 
some of the challenges of teaching these virtues in the current educational landscape. I 
conclude with a speculative discussion of potential areas for future research in RVE. 
THE EPISTEMIC PURPOSES OF EDUCATION 
Educators of all stripes have attempted clarify the purpose of education. For 
some, education is a means of political and social emancipation.217 Others view 
education in instrumental terms as a form of cultural preservation or a route to creating 
good citizens.218 And still others understand education as a means of promoting human 
flourishing and wellbeing, or an ethic of care.219 These competing visions of education 
will sometimes conflict and sometimes abet each other. In this section, I consider the 
purpose of education from a slightly different perspective: What are the epistemic 
purposes of education? In other words, what intellectual outcomes should educators 
strive for with their students? Roberts and Woods identify three “large” epistemic 
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goods: knowledge, acquaintance, and understanding.220 Once more, epistemic goods 
are positive outcomes of cognizing—outcomes that are regarded as beneficial to a 
person’s intellectual life. In this section, I provide a brief analysis of the familiar 
concept knowledge, and a more extensive treatment of acquaintance and 
understanding.  
Knowledge 
 Propositional knowledge is an important epistemic good—not only for 
education but also for life. We know all sorts of important things about traffic rules, 
safety procedures, exercise, and nutrition. Knowledge of this sort is the basis for a safe 
and functional life. In schools students acquire a body of knowledge deemed important 
for their future success. In Chapter II, I discussed the traditional definition of 
knowledge as justified true belief. Education policy today is primarily focused on the 
dissemination of just this sort of knowledge. One need look no further than the current 
implementation of standards based curricula for evidence.221 Here the emphasis is on 
imparting propositional knowledge—testable facts—that will indicate learning has 
taken place.222 A proposition is a declarative sentence that is either true or false. 
Students are taught, for example, that George Washington was the first president of the 
United States. This statement is either true or false; in cannot be both true and false. 
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When these facts are placed in relationship to other related facts, one is said to have 
acquired a body of knowledge. While I hold that propositional knowledge is essential 
to education, I maintain that possessing a body of knowledge is not as important as 
generating understanding with respect to those facts. Regardless, the important point is 
that formal schooling traditionally emphasizes the acquisition of propositional 
knowledge. However, as I will show in this chapter, this emphasis is too narrow. 
Acquaintance 
 Our experiential encounters with the world around us leave important marks on 
intellectual lives. Acquaintance is an epistemic good achieved through experience. 
Roberts and Wood describe it as follows: 
When we say that someone is acquainted with something, we do not 
mean that she is currently in immediate cognitive contact with it. We 
mean that she has had such contact and carries within her, via memory, 
aptitudes of recognition, belief formation, and understanding that are 
consequent on that earlier contact. This is the kind of cognitive 
advantage that we ascribe to someone by saying that she has had ‘a lot 
of experience’—with, say, deep-sea fishing or the financial markets.223  
Acquaintance is especially important in the context of education. For example, in 
recent years IQ tests have come under scrutiny because they are claimed to be 
culturally biased in favor of White middle-class and upper-class children. They fail to 
take into account the extent to which experience shapes a person’s understanding of 
the world. Thus, students whose experiences do not fit the White experience are at a 
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disadvantage.224 This is an unfortunate example of how misunderstanding the role of 
acquaintance in education can sustain injustice. It also highlights the importance of 
experience. 
There is little doubt that most (if not all) persons derive pleasure from certain 
kinds of experience. Seasoned travelers are quite committed to the life-enriching 
benefits of globetrotting. These exhortations often include such language as, “words 
cannot describe” and “you had to be there.” Aesthetes will, as their panegyrics 
illustrate, eloquently describe their encounters with particular works of art, while 
eschewing any notion that their praise is adequately descriptive. Even in infancy, 
children express a desire for sensory input. They put objects in their mouths, swivel 
their little heads to follow a movement or sound, and so forth. In adulthood, such first-
hand experiences enrich and deepen understanding, add color and three-dimensionality 
to knowledge. For this reason, we are apt to seek acquaintance with the world around 
us, but the value of these acquaintances does not necessarily derive from their belief-
producing ability. I may form a belief about the little bird outside my window, but the 
rich perceptual encounter—the backdrop of a gray sky, the sound of the wind, the 
stirring of the bird’s feathers, its song—is valuable (I believe) for its own sake.225 
Likewise, one may be able to give a highly detailed description of the Hagia Sophia, 
but this hardly replaces physically standing beneath its enormous golden dome, taking 
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in its sights, sounds, and smells. Neither do news reports replace first-hand encounter 
with the grizzly horrors of wars. Acquaintance furnishes the mind with additional 
points of connection and adds color and three-dimensionality.  
Acquaintance is different from propositional knowledge in that involves some 
sort of first-hand encounter. For example, when I claim to know Mr. Obama—and I 
have never met him personally—I am effectively saying that I know things about him. 
I know that he is the president of the United States, that he was born in Hawaii (poor 
example, perhaps), and that his mother wrote a dissertation. These are facts or 
propositions about Obama. If, on the other hand, the president and I have a history of 
interacting with one other—if we are acquainted—the claim that I know Mr. Obama 
takes on richer meaning. I still may know many facts about him, but I have also had 
many experiences with him. Roberts and Wood point out that the French have two 
distinct words for the verb, to know. “Here we are reminded of the distinction in French 
between savoir and connaitre. To connaitre something is to have personal, direct 
experience of it in some way; the word is particularly used of knowing people, and the 
person who connait another does not just know about him or her (have lots of warranted 
beliefs about him), but knows him, usually by having met and interacted with him.”226 
This form of knowing describes first-hand experience—an intimate encounter with some 
person, place, thing, or idea. In short, it describe what I have been calling, acquaintance. 
Understanding 
Understanding is the final and chief epistemic good. Understanding is achieved 
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through an active process of connection making. Here the focus is on merging together 
various pieces of knowledge, acquaintances, and other understandings into a 
comprehensible portrait of reality.227 In the following section, I develop the concept of 
understanding, and describe how it encompasses both knowledge and acquaintance.228 
 In recent years, epistemologists have begun to explore what is being called the 
"value-turn" in epistemology.229 A central issue in these explorations concerns the 
question: "Why is knowledge more valuable than true belief?" Plato first drew 
attention to this issue in Meno, wherein Socrates asks Meno if a man who has been to 
the town of Larisa would make a good guide. Meno, of course, answers affirmatively. 
He then asks Meno if a man who had a true belief (having never been there) about the 
way to Larisa would also make a good guide. Again, Meno agrees that he would. 
Socrates then says, “Then correct opinion is no less useful than knowledge."230 True 
belief, in this case, would seem just as useful as knowledge, but this does not explain 
why knowledge is more valuable. He goes on to argue that what makes knowledge 
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more valuable than true belief is that it is anchored by some cause, whereas true belief 
is unstable.231 Its value is derived from its constancy.  
 Not satisfied with Socrates response, epistemologists have rallied to their 
respective theories to show that they can offer a substantive response to this 
question.232 I do not intend to address all the ways they have done this. Rather, I want 
to draw attention to a particular interpretation of the Meno passage. Jonathan Kvanvig 
has claimed that Socrates might be asking a slightly different question: Is true belief as 
valuable as understanding? 233According to Kvanvig, shifting focus from knowledge to 
understanding has a number of advantages—a potential solution to the Meno problem 
among them. His central point, however, is that understanding is valuable to persons in 
a way that knowledge is not.234 In the following, I offer an explication of the concept 
of understanding—a concept I contend should be the chief epistemic aim of education. 
I demonstrate that a broader emphasis on understanding in education (rather than 
knowledge and/or skill) has advantages. When combined with an RVE, it presents an 
alternative paradigm for thinking about educational matters. 
 Understanding, in its common usages has various meanings and functions. For 
example, we sometimes specify that we understand as way of hedging—as in, "I 
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understand you feel angry with me." The intention here might be to demur, to 
effectively say: “Hold on! I know your angry but…” We also say such things when we 
feel uncertain about our interlocutors’ true feelings and desire clarification.235 These 
usages do not describe the sort of understanding in question here. Rather, we will 
consider understanding as a term indicating a "cognitive success" in which a person 
moves from mystification to clarity.236 Understanding of this sort is a process wherein 
a person succeeds in making connections. Representative usages would include: “I 
understand the concept of monarchy,” or “I understand the AIDS epidemic in South 
Africa.” These declarations indicate that one has grasped connection between various 
beliefs, experiences, understandings, and so forth. Thus, when a person moves from 
confusion or ignorance to understanding, he or she has succeeded in fitting various 
epistemic goods together.  
 Kvanvig distinguishes between two varieties of understanding: one can have a 
factive understanding or a non-factive understanding.237 When Ava claims to 
(factively) understand that Pluto is no longer counted a planet, her understanding takes 
on a propositional character, and is either true or false. In such cases, however, the 
distinction between "understanding that..." and "knowing that..." is difficult to discern. 
It would be just as comprehensible for her to claim to know that Pluto is no longer 
counted a planet. Thus, the unit of analysis in factive understanding is a single true 
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belief; this is largely indistinct from knowledge. Non-factive understanding is 
different. Non-factive understanding draws attention to the interrelationship between 
beliefs (and other epistemic goods) and the comprehensive picture that emerges—what 
Kvanvig calls an "informational chunk."238 If Ava claims to non-factively understand, 
this suggests she has considered her larger body of beliefs about the matter and has 
made relevant connections. We can extend this definition of understanding to include 
other epistemic goods too. Ava may have seen an episode of NOVA or read an article 
in Popular Science (previous knowledge), or she may have built a model of the solar 
system in an earlier grade (acquaintance). These other goods contribute to and enrich 
her understanding. When her teacher asks her elaborate she will be able to place her 
knowledge of Pluto within a larger context. Only non-factive understanding will be 
consider hereafter. 
 Non-factive understanding (just “understanding,” hereafter) has two distinctive 
qualities. First, understanding requires connection making—the ability to link various 
relevant beliefs, other understandings, and acquaintances together.239 Suppose Ruby, 
an 11th grade student, has studied the conditions that led to the First World War. When 
tested, she may perform quite well on the multiple-choice section; her propositional 
knowledge is very good. Such knowledge does not necessarily stipulate that she 
understands the causes of the First World War, although it might be a good indicator of 
understanding. Suppose Ruby is then given an essay question asking her to describe 
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how these causes relate to one another. Her success will depend upon her ability to tie 
these facts together coherently and to articulate explanatory relationships. For 
example, she may recall a conversation with her grandfather, a film or image, a 
passage from a textbook, or her teacher’s lecture. Her understanding emerges when she 
connects these disparate components together.  
Second, while Ruby may understand the causes of the First World War, it is 
also likely that her teacher's understanding surpasses her own. Likewise, a historian of 
the First World War would undoubtedly understand the subject better than Ruby or her 
teacher. The point is simply that understanding is achieved by degrees. Unlike 
knowledge (justified true belief) understanding can accommodate a degree of false 
belief—as long as that belief falls along the periphery and is not central.240 This is 
evident in Ruby's case. Her essay might have been well reasoned and largely correct, 
but it might have included some minor false assertions. One or two erroneous claims, 
however, do not eliminate the possibility that she understands. Piaget’s notion of 
assimilation and accommodation lend support to this claim. As noted in Chapter III, 
Piaget argued that persons are capable and indeed need to assimilate new idea into 
their cognitive schema.241 Let us now consider how the other epistemic goods, 
knowledge and acquaintance, fall within the purview of understanding. 
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Understanding as Connection Making 
 Earlier I suggested that understanding is achieved through a connection making 
process. Ruby’s case (above) is a good example. This is what Kvanvig has in mind 
when he writes, “For understanding requires, in its very nature, the grasping of 
explanatory connections between items of information…”242 Here, however, he is 
focused on the process of connecting facts (knowledge) together. I believe we can 
extend his definition to include other epistemic goods, which will generate an even 
richer account of understanding.  
Thus far I have considered how knowledge and acquaintance are important 
epistemic goods. There are numerous other potential epistemic goods—things like 
wisdom, wellbeing, and truth.243 Understanding is achieved when we link these 
epistemic goods together. But this is only a partial view. My understanding (or lack 
thereof) consists of many other factors: I have untested opinions, justified and 
unwarranted assumptions, biases and prejudices, hypotheses, fears and hopes, likes and 
dislikes, and so forth. Some of these might qualify as epistemic good in their own 
right; others we might think detrimental to understanding—even vicious (vice). Each, 
however, has a bearing on my pursuit of understanding. Thus, connection making is 
complex process that entails reckoning with various features of cognition. When 
successful, “Such understanding gives one a vantage point from which to assess 
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evidence, organize and make use of new information, and thus have a certain ownership 
of the contents of one’s mind.”244 Let us consider an example of complex connection 
making.  
Several weeks ago, I was driving to the grocery store when a large moving 
truck passed me. Plastered on the sides and back of the truck, were several extremely 
graphic and enormous photos of aborted fetuses. One photo showed a tiny severed 
hand laying on a U.S. coin. I was shocked and revolted and, for a split-second, did not 
even understand what I was seeing. The otherness of these images shocked my senses; 
I was forced to grapple with the moral implications of posting such images, as well as 
my own position on the abortion issue. I also recall thinking about the first amendment 
and the possibility that children would see these images. In short, to understand this 
experience, I had to reckon with a host of (true and likely false as well) interrelated 
beliefs, experiences with babies, religious convictions, and so on. I did not have a tidy 
category for this encounter. Of course, I think I understand something about this 
person’s motives.  I have talked with many ardent opponents of abortion issue, and 
have noted similar themes in their arguments. I also have a degree of knowledge about 
the abortion issue, having read about and considered the issue for many years. 
Likewise, as a parent, I am familiar with the desire to protect children from unseemly 
images, and am intimately acquainted with babies. I have drawn connections between 
these various factors and others, but my understanding of this experience is limited by 
its multifaceted complexity. I could, however, improve my understanding by drawing 
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new connections. This might entail working for a time at an abortion clinic or crisis 
pregnancy center, reading books about the abortion issue, talking with my wife, my 
friends, or simply thinking upon it some more. The main point is that understanding 
involves connection making, comes in degrees, and can be enriched with further study. 
Thus far I have argued that understanding ought to be the chief epistemic aim 
of education. In this section, I argue that the intellectual virtues shape (regulate or 
guide) our understandings, and demonstrate that obtaining understanding depends in 
part upon the possession of virtuous intellectual character traits. I highlight three 
intellectual virtues—love of knowledge, intellectual honesty and courage, and 
conscientiousness—and show how each contributes to and motivates understanding. 
LOVE OF KNOWLEDGE 
In Chapter IV, I described how Confucius placed the love of learning at the 
center of his ethics, claiming that it is requisite for the possession of other virtues.245 
He may be overstating his case; nevertheless, others in the history of philosophy have 
made similar claims. Aristotle, for example, open his Metaphysics with the claim that,  
All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we 
take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved 
for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with 
a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we 
prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that this, 
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most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many 
differences among things.246  
According to Aristotle, we value our perceptual faculties because they make the world 
around us accessible; they make knowledge possible. Love of knowledge involves 
more than a desire for new facts and information; it also involves a love of experience.  
My daughter loves dinosaurs. She draws pictures of them, reads books and 
watches documentaries; she makes up stories and pretends to be a dinosaur. The 
possible causes of dinosaur extinction drive her imagination wild. Ava is simply 
fascinated by dinosaurs, and few things bring her more joy than learning about them. 
But how does this love of knowledge regulate her understanding? First, she wants true 
beliefs about dinosaurs and this shapes the sorts of questions that matter to her. Such 
questions usually begin with, "Is it true that…” or "Do you think that..." and "Why 
would...?" Even at seven years old, she weighs and measures our responses, and will 
object to or seek clarification for answers that fail to satisfy her understanding. 
Likewise, she enjoys going to natural history museums and looking at dinosaur 
exhibits. The sheer size of these creatures, their bones, fossilized fragments of skin—
these sights color her imagination. All of these details enrich her understanding of 
dinosaurs. We see, too, the value of cultivating our students’ interests, and providing 
them with substantial first-hand educational experiences. 
While Ava’s desire to understand dinosaurs is certainly childlike, it is not 
dissimilar from the mature love of knowledge illustrated by adults. Scholarly work is a 
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good example. Scientists strive to understand the external world and prize accuracy; 
psychologists are deeply concerned with the workings of the psyche and believe such 
insights are valuable; economists are fascinated by inter-workings of monetary 
systems. Gaining new or improved understanding is a deeply satisfying feeling and 
fuels further pursuit. It provides motivation to seek out new knowledge, acquaintance, 
and understanding. 
INTELLECTUAL HONESTY AND COURAGE 
 Intellectual honesty and courage are often counted among the intellectual 
virtues. The virtue of honesty is a disposition to tell the truth—both as honest self-
appraisal and to others. It is a trait that is particularly valued in academic contexts. 
Most course syllabi at universities contain a passage on plagiarism and academic 
integrity. Violation of these policies is considered a grave academic offence and is 
generally punished quite severely. Intellectual honesty also indicates a willingness to 
be fully disclosed to oneself. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre describes an akratic 
(weak willed) gambler who sincerely commits to quitting his ruinous habit.247 A day 
comes, however, when the opportunity to gamble presents. His earlier commitment has 
faded and he gives into temptation. This is a common scenario. It is easy to imagine, 
though, that if he had been fully honest with himself from the beginning, he would 
have acknowledged that his commitment was only halfhearted. This illustrates the 
intellectual virtue of honesty, and it leads us to the second virtue—intellectual courage. 
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Self-evaluation of the sort neglected by the gambler is not easy. It takes courage to 
face our weaknesses and oftentimes even more courage to do something about them. 
Intellectual courage describes a disposition to face our fears, to take intellectual risks, 
to revise deeply held beliefs, and the like. We find an interesting example of both 
virtues in the person and pedagogy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. 248 
Former students, Douglas Gasking and A. C. Jackson, offer an interesting 
assessment of Ludwig Wittgenstein's pedagogical approach. They note that he was an 
unpredictable and sometimes awkward teacher. "At times Wittgenstein would break 
off, saying ‘Just a minute, let me think!’ and would sit for minutes on end, crouched 
forward on the edge of a chair, staring down at his upturned palm. Or he would 
exclaim with vehement sincerity: ‘This is as difficult as hell!'"249 This is not, perhaps, 
what one would expect from one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th 
century. Rather, we might expect controlled, polished, and sophisticated lectures and 
perfectly executed answers. But we can view Wittgenstein's unpredictability and 
willingness to stretch out long silences during a class another way: it models a manner 
of thinking about difficult problems; it illustrates his willingness to honestly 
acknowledge his lack of clarity. Burbules points out the Wittgenstein asks in the order 
of 800 questions in the Philosophical Investigations, answers about 100 of them, and 
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rejects 70 of these answers.250 It also takes a measure of intellectual courage to 
proclaim ignorance. 
 Wittgenstein also demonstrates how these virtues (and other, of course) 
regulate understanding. In matters of uncertainty, those questions that resist easy 
explanation, Wittgenstein models a willingness to suspend judgment. In virtue-terms, 
he models intellectual caution and courage. Likewise, his radical philosophical shift in 
his latter career, demonstrates open-mindedness to new interpretations and a love of 
learning and knowledge.251 Thus, his philosophical quest for a deeper grasp language 
and logic—a deeper understanding—was shaped and guided by these deep character 
traits. Although it is mere speculation, it seems unlikely that Wittgenstein the 
intellectual coward and liar could or would have written the Tractatus or Philosophical 
Investigations.252 Young people face similar challenges that require intellectual 
courage and honesty. Consider the matter of religious belief.  
Students, especially those in high school and college, will sometimes enter 
periods of religious conflict. They may have been raised in a very religious home, and 
these feeling of uncertainty can produce a great deal of stress. Intellectual honesty 
demands that they attend to this dilemma, but it does not necessitate a particular 
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response—that is, it does not demand that they regard faith as irrational or warranted. 
Rather, it merely disposes them to confront the issue squarely. In such cases, no easy 
formula will dictate how they should respond; they must give due consideration to 
their emotional state, the consequences of choosing one way or the other, and the 
relative importance of arriving at a conclusion. Often this will result in withhold 
judgment until they have had time to reflect further. The main point is that these 
virtues provide guidance and motivation for the pursuit of understanding.  
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS  
Understanding is complex and requires attention and willingness to sort 
through untested assumptions, motives, and ethical commitments and formative 
experiences. When, for example, we encounter a new idea or situation, especially one 
that challenges our presuppositions, (like Wittgenstein) we ought to carefully assess 
the matter. Sometimes this might involve collecting further evidence and (if necessary) 
revising our beliefs or questioning our motives. A number of positive character traits 
encourage this activity. As noted, it sometimes takes courage and honesty to subject 
our beliefs and motives to critique. There is, however, a less obvious but equally 
important intellectual virtue that motivates this evaluative activity. In short, we ought 
to be conscientious with respect to our understanding. "Conscientiousness is an 
aptitude for getting certain actions performed, not under conditions of fear, as in the 
case of courage, but under conditions of insufficient intrinsic motivation."253 When we 
lack motivation (something most teachers are familiar with) conscientiousness reminds 
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us of our epistemic responsibilities. In this section, I consider several ways that the 
virtue of conscientiousness regulates understanding.  
Many of our assumptions are perfectly reasonable. We assume that putting gas 
in the car will ensure that we arrive at our destination. We assume that chairs will hold 
our weight. We assume that (at least some of) our students will come to classes in the 
morning. These are ordinary and trivial assumptions that we ordinarily take for 
granted. Of course, it is always possible that we might have car trouble, select a 
defective chair, or that inclement weather might result in a cancellation of classes. 
Experience has taught us that these events are anomalous. Thus our epistemic 
responsibility to conscientiously evaluate our assumptions does not reduce to 
skepticism. Indeed, it is unlikely that a person could live in constant questioning about 
everything he or she knows. Even if it were possible, such an existence would likely be 
intolerably unbearable. Nevertheless, some of our assumptions do require 
conscientious evaluation. In the United States, for example, the population is nearly 
split down the middle politically. Many of these persons have been initiated into one 
political camp or the other, simply by virtue of growing up in a particular region. Thus, 
they may have inherited a set of political assumptions through parents. With the 
economy in shambles and two protracted wars, an argument might be made that 
serious reflection is needed if we are to "survive" these crises. Unfortunately, many of 
these same persons are politically apathetic. Fear of the future consequences is not 
sufficiently motivating, nor is a desire for accurate beliefs the present state-of-affairs. 
The intellectual virtue of conscientiousness, however, impels us to consider these 
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issues in spite of our apathy. In other words, when love of knowledge, open-
mindedness, and intellectual honesty fail to properly motivate us, conscientiousness 
reminds us of our epistemic responsibilities. 
INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE AND COMMUNICATION 
I have argued that understanding is the chief epistemic aim of education. This 
discussion focused mainly on individuals as responsible epistemic agents. However, I 
also want to consider how the pursuit of understanding applies in the social context of 
education—what we might call social understanding. Both teachers and students, as 
educational partners, benefit from understanding each other. Communication is at the 
heart of education and, in large part, hinges on the concept of understanding. 
Academic content is delivered via spoken and written word, by demonstration, and 
tacitly. Worldviews are articulated through conversations, through texts, even through 
gestures, styles of dress, music, the list goes on. At every point in the course of a 
school day, something or someone is communicating.  
Not surprisingly, academic discussions about the role of communication in 
education are ongoing. Most (not all) discussants in this conversation agree that 
education is a two-way process of dialog between interlocutors.254 Patrick Slattery, 
Karen Krasny, and Michael O’Malley, for example, resist the search for 
communicative and interpretative certainty. “Hermeneutics, then, must foreground the 
interpretive process in the dialogic polyphony that actively undermines consensus and 
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concretization.”255 Communication becomes a dynamic, ever shifting, process wherein 
numerous voices are present. On this view, the quest for communicative certainty is 
given up in favor of the multitude of intersecting voices—voices that are “aesthetically 
present” to one another. In short, no one owns the conversation or has final interpretive 
authority. What character traits would their dialogical interpreter need to possess in 
order to be “aesthetical present to the other,” to value “liberatory justice” and “ethical 
reflection?”256 From a virtue theoretic perspective, this demands openness—a kind of 
receptivity to other voices and perspectives. And openness entails conscientious 
listening, respect for other voices, and cautiousness with respect to one’s interpretive 
judgments. It is difficult to see how this interlocutor could be rash, close-minded, 
quick to judge, and unwilling to question her own views. 
We have all experienced this sort of conversational one-sidedness. One party 
seems bent on controlling the conversation—seems disinterested in the other person’s 
views, wants only for the other party to stop speaking so she can talk. This close-
mindedness makes dialog impossible. Indeed, it limits understanding as well. If social 
understanding is a form of connection making, then it entails an open disposition to 
listen—a willingness to encounter others and their ideas. Nicolas Burbules speaks of 
communicative virtues. These virtues include "tolerance, patience, an openness to give 
and receive criticism, the inclination to admit that one might be mistaken, the desire to 
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reinterpret or translate one's own concerns…the self-imposition of restraint in order 
that others may have a turn to speak, and…the willingness to listen thoughtfully and 
attentively."257 Communicative virtues regulate discourse and ensure that others are 
heard. Thus they are directly tied to the process of education and the acquisition of 
understanding. In this sense, communicative virtues are also intellectual virtues. 
Consider the typical classroom. Twenty-five or thirty unique individuals share a 
small room with the expressed purpose of learning. Each of these persons has a 
history, like and dislikes, hopes and fears, attitudes toward learning, and so on. One of 
these persons, the teacher, is tasked with the responsibility of providing fair and 
accessible learning environment. To meet his students’ needs, however, he needs to 
know something about them. He needs to communicate with them. Max van Manen 
terms this process a “pedagogical relation” with students. He writes: “To have a sense 
of pedagogy implies that one is capable of insights into the child's being or character. 
But more important pedagogy implies distinguishing between what is appropriate or 
inappropriate, good or bad, right or wrong, suitable or less suitable for children.”258 
What van Manen makes clear is that this form of pedagogy depends upon a deep 
capacity to see and hear students. And not all educators, he claims, have this capacity 
in the same degree. “A pedagogue is an educator (teacher, counselor, administrator, 
etc.) who feels addressed by children, who understands children in a caring way, and 
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who has a personal commitment and interest in children's education and their growth 
toward mature adulthood.”259 To feel addressed by students suggest that one is 
receptive to the communicative nature of education. The true pedagogue is one who 
embraces this relational role. Let us contrast two fictional examples. 
1. Mr. Jones 
He was tired. As students poured in he went to the chalkboard and wrote a short 
prompt. “Tell about the best day of your life.” This was time killer—a way of burning 
up the clock and shortening another boring lesson. The students settled down to write; 
they knew better than cross Mr. Jones. His temper was legendary. They wrote for 10 
minutes before he called them to a halt. As usual, he selected three students to share. 
Jimmy, a troubled boy of 17 described a picnic he had with his mother who was now 
incarcerated. At one point, another student must have made rude comment, because 
Jimmy shouted a loud “shut up!” Mr. Jones put it down quickly, “Both of you shut up! 
Let’s move on. Katie, share yours.” Jimmy objected, “But I wasn’t finished!” “You are 
now,” replied Mr. Jones. Katie and then James shared their memories. He looked at the 
clock; they’d burned 20 minutes. “Only 30 minutes to go,” he thought. “Open your 
books to page 322. We’re reading a story called ‘Sonny’s Blues.’” They read it. The 
bell rang and they left. 
2. Mr. Smith 
Mr. Smith smiled and joked with students as they entered the classroom. On the 
board he’d written a prompt: “Tell me about the best day of your life.” As students 
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settled down to write, Mr. Smith did too. He always participated. After 10 minutes he 
asked students to finish up. As usual, Mr. Smith began the exercise, describing his 
elation at the birth of his son. “What about you? Would anybody like to share?” Jimmy 
raised his hand. This excited Mr. Smith. He’d been trying to reach out to the boy all 
semester. As Jimmy began his narrative about a picnic with his now-incarcerated 
mother, Mr. Smith felt his excitement grow. Just then, he saw John lean forward and 
whisper something in Jimmy’s ear. Jimmy’s face darkened and he shouted, “shut up!” 
Before things could escalate, Mr. Smith gave John “the look”—a look that said: “You 
can do better that.” John looked embarrassed and ashamed. He admired his teacher. 
“Please continue, Jimmy.” Mr. Smith knew today would be a good day—they were 
reading “Sonny’s Blues.” “Perfect,” he thought.  
The most obvious difference between these teachers is that Mr. Smith 
genuinely cares for his students, while Mr. Jones is simply collecting a paycheck. In 
virtue terms, Smith was open-minded and compassionate, while Jones displayed 
several vicious qualities. A less noticeable difference occurs with respect to the use of 
narrative. Jones clearly thinks of the writing prompt as a time waster—a way of 
avoiding his responsibilities. Smith, however, sees narrative as a pathway to 
dialogue—to understanding a trouble young man. Max van Manen explains, “A 
teacher who does not understand the inner life of a child does not know who it is that 
he or she is teaching.”260 Through narrative—in this case a very personal story—Smith 
allows himself to be “addressed” by Jimmy. This openness grants Smith access to 
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Jimmy. It is also notable that he saw a chance to surreptitiously address the day’s 
lesson to Jimmy. Here we see how communicative understanding links up with the 
epistemic demands of education. By virtue of his openness and receptivity, and his 
genuine compassion for Jimmy, Mr. Smith understood (in a limited sense) Jimmy’s 
need for emotional validation. Moreover, this need could be further met through 
intellectual engagement with a classic work of short fiction. The emotional and 
intellectual bleed into one another. 
PROPOSALS, CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 In this section, I discuss two approaches to teaching intellectual virtue that have 
been proposed by virtue epistemologists. While there is much to recommend these 
approaches, I suggest that the current educational climate is not receptive to RVE. I 
consider this problem and suggest areas for future research with respect to teaching 
intellectual virtues. I then consider two additional areas for future research, and then 
conclude this dissertation with some summative remarks.  
Two Proposals 
In her article on teaching the intellectual virtues, Heather Battaly articulates a 
view, I assume, many teachers would heartily endorse: 
Many of us not only want our students to learn about better ways of 
thinking, but to become better thinkers. We want our students to become 
skilled in deductive and inductive reasoning, to become open-minded, 
conscientious, and intellectually courageous, and to care about truth for 
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its own sake. In short, we want our students to become intellectually 
virtuous.261 
What is the best way to teach intellectual virtue? Two approaches have been 
recommended: Linda Zagzebski’s recent work on exemplarist virtue theory, and 
Heather Battaly’s practical insights on developing and practicing intellectual virtue in 
the classroom.  
 Zagzebski proposes a novel virtue theory based on the observation that we 
learn by imitation. First, though, she points out that moral theories are generally 
written for philosophers and philosophy students.  
We produce moral theories first for other philosophers, and secondarily 
for students in philosophy classes. But we think that theoretical 
discussions can ultimately influence practice. In this essay I compare a 
variety of moral theories at the most abstract level of theoretical structure. 
It is pretty obvious that theory at that level does not influence practice, 
but one of the issues I am interested in is the path from abstract theory to 
revisions of practice. I suspect that the path goes through disciplines other 
than philosophy, publications aimed at the general educated public, the 
arts and the media, and sometimes the law, and most of the time the path 
withers before ordinary people are affected, but theory can influence 
practice. I think that it is an advantage if a theory can link up with moral 
practice in a plausible way, particularly if it can link up with narratives 
that capture the imaginations of ordinary people.262  
One way to follow the path from theory to practice, she argues, is to refine our moral 
principals and character by referencing exemplars—persons whose moral and (for our 
purposes) intellectual practices are exemplary. Because these persons are observable, 
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she thinks this empirically grounds our understanding of the intellectual virtues. For 
example, if I want to know what intellectual courage looks like, I can examine the life 
and work of someone who demonstrates that attribute. We should do more than 
reference these persons, however, we also ought to imitate them. Two insights 
undergird her argument.  
First, notes that admiration is a very powerful emotion that motivates imitation. 
Thus we should select exemplars “directly through the emotion of admiration.”263 This 
is especially notable in the case of students. Students have a penchant for imitating 
figures in popular culture that embody characteristics that they admire. I am reminded 
of the hot-tempered basketball player, Charles Barkley, and his infamous denial of “role 
model” status. Many teachers and parents were outraged because they understood how 
powerful admiration can be.264 Thus, teachers should find ways to direct their students’ 
attentions to virtuous exemplars. To this end, Zagzebski advocates studying narrative 
accounts of fictional and non-fictional characters.265 With a little guidance (showing 
them what to look for) students can be encouraged to pursue an autobiographical study 
of some person (real or fictional) they find admirable. This might lead to an essay or 
presentation in which they elaborate that individual’s positive intellectual character 
traits.  
 Heather Battaly agrees with Zagzebski that students learn intellectual virtue 
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through imitation, but she makes a further suggestion: that students also learn 
intellectual virtue through practice. First, she notes that intellectual virtues “require 
virtuous motivations”—chief among them, a high regard for truth. She thinks instilling 
a love of truth is the first step.266 This can be modeled, discussed, illustrated through 
exemplars; any number of strategies can be employed. The main point is that students 
develop a respect for the value of well-grounded belief. To this end, she recommends 
that teachers discuss and illustrate the differences between “intellectual motivations” 
and “intellectual actions.” According to Battaly, “Intellectual actions are (roughly) 
actions that one performs in acquiring beliefs; and intellectual motivations are (roughly) 
one’s motivations for performing these actions.”267 Sample intellectual motivations 
include desire for knowledge, desire to believe what is “easy,” desire to maintain 
already held beliefs, and desire to believe what one “hopes” is true. Thus intellectual 
motivations can be both positive and negative in nature. These motivations are the 
reasons for our intellectual actions, which include such things as “jumping to 
conclusions, suspending belief, entertaining objections to one’s own view, constructing 
replies, defending one’s view against objections, conceding that another’s view is 
correct” and the like.268 What is important (and accurate, I think) about this distinction 
is that most students will have never thought about the connection between their 
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intellectual motivations and their intellectual activity in school. Moreover, this 
suggests that intellectual virtues should play a regulative role in the lives of students—
that is, they should provide intellectual guidance. Roberts and Wood claim that a 
regulative understanding of intellectual virtue “clarifies the character of the intellectual 
life in a way that can actually help people live that life. Conceptual clarification is an 
important part of education, and the improvement of intellectual character is a kind of 
education.”269  
Challenges 
A concern facing the application of RVE (and the theories just outlined) in 
education results from the current emphasis on standards-based education. In 2001, 
congress passed the landmark No Child Left Behind act (NCLB).270 This act mandated 
that schools be held accountable to state created educational standards. Repeated 
failure to meet the standards of Adequate Yearly Progress can lead to disciplinary 
measures, and ultimately the closing of a school. While the impulse behind this act was 
commendable, to improve the academic performance of all students, the results have 
been mixed.271 One criticism that many teachers offer is that NCLB has created a 
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“teach to the test” culture in schools. Deviating from material not targeted in the 
standards is sometimes thought to be a dangerous luxury.272 
 Teaching the intellectual virtues in this environment is challenging for a couple 
reasons. First, the ideal educational setting to teach the virtues is likely a liberal arts 
environment, understood here as an environment that takes a holistic view of the 
“educated person.” This is a setting wherein students are encouraged to participate 
multiple discourses from multiple intellectual traditions. It is also an environment that 
takes a wider view of the epistemic aims of education, as noted above. However, in 
many public schools the current standardized educational model is a lockstep process 
of gaining very specific knowledge and skills. Student achievement is a measurable, 
quantifiable phenomenon. Success is quantified. A holistic view of education, one 
informed by RVE, expands these boundaries: “The education in question is not just 
‘technical’—a training in specialized skills—but is also a formation in human 
excellence. The trait products of such an education for life are called virtues.”273 Such 
an education, however, does match up with the present state-of-affairs. This does not 
preclude the possibility of inculcating the intellectual virtues, but it does represent a 
challenge. As such, further research might be done to explore how intellectual virtues 
can be inculcated into the existing educational milieu.  
 Two related challenges are found in book II of Aristotle’s Ethics. He writes, 
“Virtue, then, is of two kinds: that of the intellect and that of character. Intellectual 
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virtue owes its origin and development mainly to teaching, for which reason its 
attainment requires experience and time.”274 If he is correct, then the intellectual 
virtues have place in the curricula. But, Aristotle also notes two necessary 
requirements for the cultivation of intellectual virtue—experience and time. The 
problem of experience describes a disruption that results when a student’s experiences 
at home (and elsewhere) are incommensurate with the values she learns at school. 
Having taught high school English for three years, I can attest to the frustration many 
teachers feel when parents neglect their children’s homework, tests, and so forth. This 
neglect often results in students’ dismissing the importance of completing these tasks. 
Similarly, most teachers encourage their students to value hard work and diligence; too 
often parents undermine this virtue though their own laziness. This poses a question 
for teachers who wish to promote the intellectual virtues: Can a student learn 
intellectual virtue despite external corrupting influences? Here we encounter the 
problem of time: It seems unlikely in the case of older students who have not been 
properly taught beforehand. However, it may be that with sufficient time, beginning 
perhaps in the first years of school, students could overcome this disparity of 
experience. After all, students are in school for hours each day; this might be enough 
time. 
Areas for Future Research 
 In the course of this study, it became increasingly clear that I would only be able 
to address a small percentage of the issues germane to teaching intellectual virtue. In this 
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section, I highlight two areas that warrant further scrutiny—areas I believe are 
particularly important: the application of VE to existing educational theories, and the 
issue of cultural diversity. 
In Chapter II, I highlighted the issue of epistemological diversity in education. 
We saw that the educational theories can be roughly divided into three categories: anti-
realist, critical, and realist epistemologies. I pointed out several connections between VE 
and these theories along the way, but I believe that further study is warranted. For 
example, constructivist epistemologies stress the importance of the constructing new 
knowledge. In doing so, students make meaning from their experiences and learning. 
How, then, would the intellectual virtue function in the construction of new knowledge 
and the meaning-making process? In many respects, this process is analogous to the 
concept of understanding advocated in this dissertation. If I am right about this, then 
constructivist literature in education might be a tremendous resource for the application 
of RVE. This will naturally lead to some interesting differences—especially with respect 
to more radical forms of constructivism. Nevertheless, work might be done to explore 
the connections between constructivism and VE.  
Likewise, Roberts and Wood argue that VE shares some thematic similarities 
with postmodern and existential thought. For example, they discuss the works of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Jacques Derrida, and Søren Kierkegaard in great detail, highlighting 
some interesting (and surprising) points of contact.275 Lorraine Code is another 
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epistemologist whose work draws upon sources not typically associated with traditional 
Anglo epistemology.276 This willingness to draw upon non-traditional—even 
conventionally antagonistic—sources illustrates how the concept of intellectual virtue is 
implicitly present or latent in theoretical orientations well outside the traditional scope of 
epistemology.277 This is (to me) an exciting feature of VE—one that warrants further 
investigation. Indeed, it suggests that VE and educational theory will find important 
points of methodological contact. Finally, attention also might be drawn to critical 
theories—especially their emphasis on justice—as intellectually virtuous modes of 
thinking. In other words, does a critical intellectual stance and commitment to justice 
entail certain epistemic virtues?  
 A second area that warrants further consideration was highlighted in Chapter IV. 
There I showed that concepts of virtue are present most cultural contexts. However, a 
more extensive study of specific virtues would improve our understanding of VE’s 
application in diverse educational settings. For example, how should we understand the 
role of open-mindedness across cultures? Likewise, a worthy research project might look 
at the “language of virtue” already present in various epistemological paradigms.278 
Indeed, I believe virtue-based language is intentionally and unintentionally used in a 
                                                
276. For an excellent example, see Lorraine Code, Epistemic Responsibility (Hanover, NH: University 
Press of New England, 1987). 
 
277. By antagonistic, I mean to say sources and thinkers whose work is generally critical of “analytic” 
approaches to philosophy. I believe that virtue-based approaches to knowledge have potential to fruitfully 
engage with such works and ideas.  
 
278. This is a term used by David Carr in his argument for the virtues as means of communication. For 
further information, see David Carr, “Character and Moral Choice in the Cultivation of Virtue,” 
Philosophy 78, no. 304 (2003): 231. 
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variety of theoretical contexts.279 If correct, how should we understand this and what are 
the implications? Finally, a curriculum based on the intellectual virtues would have to 
make specific content choices, e.g., what texts, experiences, films, and so forth best 
respect this diversity? Thus further work could be done to develop these kinds of 
curricula.  
CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I have developed a regulative virtue epistemology for the 
theory and practice of education. I deemed this project a worthy undertaking for several 
reasons. First, virtue epistemology has risen to prominence in philosophy but has been 
largely neglected in education. Given education’s tight connection to issues related to 
epistemology (e.g., belief formation, knowledge, rationality, truth, and so forth), it 
seemed to me that further study was merited. Second, whereas traditional epistemology 
is highly abstract and difficult to apply to education, VE has direct application to 
education through its analysis of persons. And, third, “wide” VE—the sort advocated 
herein—broadens its consideration to include other epistemic goals, things like 
acquaintance and understanding. I believe this is particularly important given the 
knowledge-and-skills approach that seems to dominate contemporary educational policy.  
The RVE discussed in this chapter, however, also provides a more holistic model 
for thinking knowledge and other epistemic goods. Recall that traditional epistemology, 
and some forms of “narrow” VE primarily focus on knowledge as the central concept in 
epistemology. Analogously, educational policy has limited its attentions to the 
                                                
279. Here scholars of Alfred N. Whitehead’s work might find fruitful points of contact.  For example, see 
Alfred N. Whitehead, Aims of Education and Other Essays (New York: The Free Press, 1967) 
 152 
acquisition of knowledge and skill, e.g., the standardized testing movement. Both fields 
have been critical of these limitations (much more so in education), and have taken steps 
to widen these boundaries. To introduce an RVE, however, it was necessary to address 
three main areas.  
First, I have explicated the basic concepts of epistemology through a discussion 
of contemporary work in the philosophy. This provided context for discussing 
knowledge in the rest of the dissertation. I illustrated how VE is a response to certain 
challenges promulgated after Edmond Gettier published his landmark paper. In the main, 
virtue epistemologists responded to Gettier’s counter-examples by shifting their analysis 
to the role of persons in the formation of “creditable” true belief—the sort of true belief 
that a person can take credit for. I then distinguished between a pair of virtue-based 
approaches: reliabilism and responsibilism. I focused my attention on the latter and 
developed a particular account that draws heavily from the work Robert Roberts and W. 
Jay Wood. I termed this “wide” virtue epistemology because it broadens the boundaries 
of epistemological study to include other epistemic goods like understanding and 
acquaintance. This final point figured heavily in my final chapter.  
Second, I also provided an overview of knowledge in education—that is, how 
theorists have understood and discussed knowledge. I highlighted three broad 
epistemological categories: anti-realism, critical approaches, and realism. Most theories 
of knowledge in education fit in one or more of these categories. Along the way, I 
highlighted a few points of contact between these educational epistemologies and VE. I 
then drew attention to some interesting analogies that can be drawn between education 
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and epistemology. In short, both fields experienced similar internal struggles and 
transformation.  
And, third, RVE depends upon the concept of virtue—a concept that some might 
worry is distinctly Western. I shared this worry and, as such, investigated the concept of 
virtue in multiple cultural and religious contexts, including Confucianism, Buddhism, 
Greek philosophy and contemporary virtue ethics, and African concepts of virtue as 
found in the cultures of the Yoruba and Akan. Here I determined that, while many 
differences exists, each of these cultures have concepts of virtue that play an integral role 
their respective societies. And, finally, I considered how virtues might aid in cross-
cultural discourse through a consideration of Sharon Todd’s critique of 
cosmopolitanism. 
Bearing these conceptual and contextual factors in mind, in this final chapter, I 
considered the how an RVE might function in education. I argued that understanding—
not knowledge and skill—ought to be the chief epistemic goal of education. This does 
not mean that knowledge and skill have no value—not at all. Instead, understanding is a 
connection making process—a broader concept that entails these other epistemic goods. 
I then examine how three intellectual virtues regulate the acquisition of understanding. 
This was followed by a consideration of the role of social understanding and intellectual 
virtue in the social dimensions of education—specifically, through an examination of 
communication in schools. I argued that intellectual virtues and understanding are 
integral to the communicative practices. I then introduced two proposals for teaching 
intellectual virtues. Although these have some merit, I believe that the current 
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educational milieu is not conducive for the cultivation of intellectual virtue. And, finally, 
I introduced several areas that warrant future research. 
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